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I. INTRODUCTION
For most of his twenty-five years on the United States Supreme Court,
Justice Kennedy has been predominantly known as a moderate civil libertarian.
He has struck a course between those Justices perceived as conservative—such
as Chief Justices Rehnquist and Roberts, and Justices Scalia, Thomas, and
Alito—and those Justices perceived as liberal—such as Justices Brennan,
1
Marshall, Blackmun, Stevens, Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan. This
Article seeks to explore Justice Kennedy’s jurisprudence with respect to his
political position’s influence on his decision making, and specifically Justice
Kennedy’s jurisprudence relating to the religion clauses of the First Amendment.
Part II of this Article discusses Justice Kennedy’s moderate civil-libertarian
position. In contrast, Part III notes that in a few cases Justice Kennedy has joined
his more conservative judicial colleagues and that he may join them in future
cases. Part IV then notes that with respect to the religion clauses of the First
Amendment, the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause, Justice
Kennedy has likewise adopted more conservative judicial positions.
For most of his tenure on the Court, Justice Kennedy served with other
moderate-to-liberal Republican-appointed Justices, including moderate Justices
O’Connor and Souter, and more liberal Justices Blackmun and Stevens. As this
Article goes to press, the Court is split between four conservative, Republicanappointed Justices—Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia, Thomas, and
Alito—and four liberal, Democratic-appointed Justices—Justices Ginsburg,
Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan. As he is a Republican and appointed by
2
Republican Presidents, and without the pull of moderate Republicans on the
Court, it is possible that Justice Kennedy may tend to lean more toward the
conservative, Republican side in future cases. If so, his legacy on the Court may
not be as a moderate civil libertarian, which it is today, but reflect more the
conservative strain in his jurisprudence.
II. KENNEDY AS A MODERATE CIVIL LIBERTARIAN
Justice Kennedy’s moderate civil-libertarian approach is most prominent in
four different areas of Supreme Court jurisprudence: (1) Due Process and Equal
Protection Clause analysis, (2) First Amendment, Freedom of Speech Doctrine,

1. See generally FRANK J. COLUCCI, JUSTICE KENNEDY JURISPRUDENCE: THE FULL AND NECESSARY
MEANING OF LIBERTY 1–2 (2009), and sources cited therein.
2. Justice Kennedy, a native of Sacramento, California, received his B.A. from Stanford University in
1958, spending his senior year at the London School of Economics. He received his LL.B. from Harvard Law
School in 1961. He was in private practice in San Francisco, California from 1961–63, and in Sacramento,
California from 1963–75. In 1975, he was confirmed to sit on the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit, after being nominated by President Ford. President Reagan nominated him to be an Associate Justice of
the Supreme Court in 1987, and he was confirmed and took his seat on February 18, 1988.
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(3) criminal defendants’ constitutional rights, and (4) structural issues of
separation of powers and federalism.
A. Due Process and Equal Protection Clause Analysis
1. Sexual Orientation Cases
Justice Kennedy wrote for the Court in Romer v. Evans that Amendment 2 of
the Colorado Constitution violated the Equal Protection Clause because it lacked
3
a rational relation to a legitimate end. Amendment 2 barred any law entitling
gays, lesbians, or bisexuals to “claim any minority status, quota preferences,
4
protected status or claim of discrimination.” Justice Kennedy stated that the
breadth of the law made gays and lesbians unequal to everyone else, and thus the
only conceivable justification for the law was illegitimate animus toward persons
5
based upon sexual orientation. Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist
6
and Justice Thomas, dissented.
Reflecting a moderate civil-libertarian position, however, Justice Kennedy
did not accept the argument that Amendment 2 burdened a fundamental right or
7
targeted a suspect class thereby warranting application of heightened scrutiny.
This is true despite conflicting arguments stressing a history of discriminatory
legislation based upon false stereotypes, and despite increasing evidence that
sexual orientation is a substantially immutable characteristic determined
predominantly by genetics and hormonal influences and not the product of
8
individual choice. Under some state constitutions, state supreme courts have
ruled that sexual orientation discrimination is a suspect class, triggering strict
9
scrutiny. One could also argue that discrimination based upon sexual orientation
draws distinctions based upon sex, and thus is a form of gender discrimination
10
that should trigger intermediate review. Despite such arguments, Supreme Court

3. 517 U.S. 620, 635 (1996).
4. COLO. CONST. art. II, § 30b (held unconstitutional by Romer, 517 U.S. at 635).
5. Romer, 517 U.S. at 632, 635.
6. Id. at 636–50 (Scalia, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and Thomas, J., dissenting) (Amendment 2 reflects
the traditional “view that homosexuality is morally wrong and socially harmful.”).
7. Id. at 631.
8. See generally Janet E. Halley, The Politics of the Closet: Towards Equal Protection for Gay, Lesbian
and Bisexual Identity, 36 UCLA L. REV. 915, 937–46 (1989); Jeffrey A. Kershaw, Toward an Establishment
Theory of Gay Personhood, 58 VAND. L. REV. 555, 580–93 (2005).
9. See, e.g., In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 401–02 (Cal. 2008); Tanner v. Or. Health Sciences
Univ., 971 P.2d 425, 445–48 (Or. App. 1998); Kentucky v. Wasson, 842 S.W.2d 487, 499–502 (Ky. 1992). This
view has also appeared in some dissenting state supreme court opinions. See, e.g., Hernandez v. Robles, 855
N.E.2d 1, 23, 27–30 (N.Y. 2006) (Kaye, C.J., joined by Ciparick, J., dissenting); Andersen v. King County, 138
P.3d 963 (Wash. 2006) (Fairhurst, J., joined by Bridge, Owens & Chambers, JJ., dissenting); id. at 1038
(Bridge, J., concurring in dissent).
10. See, e.g., Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 407, 412, 422–23, 441 & n.31 (Conn.
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majorities, led by Justice Kennedy, and thus lower federal courts, have
consistently treated constitutional questions involving discrimination based upon
11
sexual orientation as involving only rational review.
Nonetheless, under rational review, gays and lesbians have had some
significant legal victories. In 1986, the Court held, by a 5–4 decision in Bowers v.
12
Hardwick, that a law criminalizing sodomy was constitutional. In 2003, the
13
Court overruled Bowers in Lawrence v. Texas. Joined by Justices Stevens,
Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, Justice Kennedy wrote that a reasoned elaboration
of the Court’s precedents
show an emerging awareness that liberty gives substantial protection to
adult persons in deciding how to conduct their private lives in matters
pertaining to sex. . . . When homosexual conduct is made criminal by the
law of the State, that declaration in and of itself is an invitation to subject
homosexual persons to discrimination both in the public and private
14
spheres. . . . [This] demeans the lives of homosexual persons.
As in Romer, Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice
15
Thomas, dissented.
This disagreement between Justices Kennedy and Scalia in Lawrence may
have application beyond the facts of the particular case. On behalf of the Court,
and echoing a dissent by Justice Stevens in Bowers, Justice Kennedy said that
“the fact that the governing majority in a State has traditionally viewed a
particular practice as immoral is not a sufficient reason for upholding a law
16
prohibiting the practice.” Justice Scalia pointed out in his dissent that this

2008); Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 63–67 (Haw. 1993); Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 896–97 (Iowa
2009).
11. See generally Equal. Found. of Greater Cincinnati v. City of Cincinnati, 54 F.3d 261 (6th Cir. 1995);
Steffan v. Perry, 41 F.3d 677, 686–93 (D.C. Cir. 1994); Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454, 463–66 (7th Cir.
1989); Nat’l Gay Task Force v. Bd. of Educ., 729 F.2d 1270, 1273 (10th Cir. 1984). In 1988, a Ninth Circuit
panel did apply strict scrutiny to the Army’s policy of discrimination based upon sexual orientation in Watkins
v. United States, 847 F.2d 1329, 1345–49 (9th Cir. 1988), but on en banc review, the case was resolved on
grounds of equitable estoppel preventing the government from failing to reenlist the individual in the particular
case. 875 F.2d 699, 705–07, 771 (9th Cir. 1989). Since Watkins, the Ninth Circuit has applied rational review in
these kinds of cases. See, e.g., High Tech Gays v. Def. Indus. Sec. Clearance Off., 895 F.2d 563, 571–74 (9th
Cir. 1990).
12. 478 U.S. 186, 191–94 (1986).
13. 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (Kennedy, J., opinion for the Court).
14. Id. at 572, 575.
15. Id. at 598, 602 (Scalia, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J. and Thomas, J., dissenting) (“[A]n ‘emerging
awareness’ is by definition not ‘deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition[s]’. . . . Many Americans
[still] do not want persons who openly engage in homosexual conduct as partners in their business, as
scoutmasters for their children, as teachers in their children’s schools, or as boarders in their home. They view
this as protecting themselves and their families from a lifestyle that they believe to be immoral . . . .”).
16. Id. at 577–78 (citing Bowers, 478 U.S. at 216 & n.9) (Stevens, J., joined by Brennan & Marshall, JJ.,
dissenting (citing Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11–12 (1967))).
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reasoning “effectively decrees the end of all morals legislation” and that this
includes laws against “bigamy, same-sex marriage, adult incest, prostitution,
17
masturbation, adultery, fornication, bestiality, and obscenity.” Justice Kennedy
indicated that the case was more limited, saying:
The present case does not involve minors. It does not involve persons
who might be injured or coerced or who are situated in relationships
where consent might not easily be refused. It does not involve public
conduct or prostitution. It does not involve whether the government must
give formal recognition to any relationship[s] that homosexual persons
seek to enter. The case does involve two adults who, with full and mutual
consent from each other, engaged in sexual practices common to [their]
18
lifestyle.
Justice Kennedy’s passage is consistent with the principle concerning giving
other persons equal concern and respect and not engaging in arbitrary coercion.
This principle makes it possible to draw distinctions among Justice Scalia’s
“parade of horribles.” Because they are related to protecting against coercion and
exploitation, laws against bigamy, adult incest, prostitution, bestiality, and
19
obscenity likely can still be criminalized after Lawrence. Masturbation cannot,
20
and fornication and adultery likely cannot. Same-sex marriage will likely
eventually become a constitutional right, but only after a period of increasing
21
legislative acceptance in a number of states.

17. Id. at 590, 599 (Scalia, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and Thomas, J., dissenting).
18. Id. at 578.
19. Id. at 590 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
20. See generally Martin v. Ziherl, 607 S.E.2d 367, 369–71 (Va. 2005) (fornication statute
unconstitutional after Lawrence, and thus fornication no longer a bar to suit for herpes transmission); Suzanne
B. Goldberg, Morals-Based Justifications for Lawmaking: Before and After Lawrence v. Texas, 88 MINN. L.
REV. 1233, 1247–58 (2004) (stating that regulation on grounds of traditional “morals” was accepted between
1873–1937, but since 1954, the Court has almost never upheld a statute based on “moral” grounds alone, with
the exception of Bowers v. Hardwick, which has now been overruled); Hillary Greene, Note, Undead Laws: The
Use of Historically Unenforced Criminal Statutes in Non-Criminal Litigation, 16 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 169,
174–78 (1997); Gabrielle Viator, Note, The Validity of Criminal Adultery Prohibitions After Lawrence v. Texas,
39 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 837 (2006) (noting that twenty-three states continue to recognize adultery as a crime,
although statutes rarely enforced).
21. The Supreme Court will hear the issue sooner, rather than later. See Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052
(9th Cir. 2012), cert. granted sub nom., Hollingsworth v. Perry, 2012 No.12-144, 2012 WL 3134429 (U.S. Dec.
7, 2012). The Ninth Circuit held California Proposition 8’s ban recognizing same-sex marriages in California
unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause. Id. On this issue, see Larry Levine,
Justice Kennedy’s “Gay Agenda”: Romer, Lawrence, and the Struggle for Marriage Equality, 44 MCGEORGE
L. REV. 1 (2013).
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2. Abortion Rights Cases
In 1989, the Court was faced with an opportunity to overrule or dramatically
limit Roe v. Wade. In Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, a three-Justice
plurality opinion of Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justices White and
Kennedy, criticized Roe and stated that Roe’s “trimester framework has left this
Court to serve as the country’s ‘ex officio medical board with powers to approve
or disapprove medical and operative practices and standards throughout the
22
United States.’” Justice Scalia indicated his willingness to overturn Roe in its
23
entirety. In contrast, Justice O’Connor decided that it was not necessary in
Webster to consider Roe’s broader implications, even though she had previously
24
indicated discomfort with the Roe framework. In Webster, Justice O’Connor
concluded that even under the Roe framework, the substantive regulations at
issue in this case—a ban on use of public employees, facilities, or funds for
performance or assistance with nontherapeutic abortions (that is, those abortions
25
not needed for the mother’s health), and physicians being required to perform
reasonable viability tests on a fetus believed to be of twenty or more weeks
26
gestational age—were constitutional. Laws banning use of public funds or
public facilities for abortions have routinely been viewed as constitutional under
27
Roe.
Three years later, in 1992, Roe’s legacy was squarely faced in Planned
28
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey. In a 5–4 decision, the Court
29
decided not to overrule Roe v. Wade in its entirety. Justice Scalia, with Chief
30
Justice Rehnquist and Justices White and Thomas, dissented on that matter.
Justice Scalia said that the Constitution does not protect a fundamental liberty to
abort an unborn child because of two facts: “(1) the Constitution says absolutely
nothing about it, and (2) the longstanding traditions of American society have
31
permitted it to be legally proscribed.” In contrast, Justice Blackmun would have
32
had the Court not disturb Roe’s holding and trimester framework in any respect.

22. 492 U.S. 490, 518–19 (1989) (Rehnquist, C.J., joined by White & Kennedy, JJ., plurality).
23. Id. at 532 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
24. Id. at 525 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
25. C.f. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, ABORTION (9th ed. 2009) (defining a therapeutic abortion as one
that is “carried out to preserve the life or health of the mother”).
26. Id. at 523–31 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring the judgment) (citing Thornburgh v.
Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 828 (1986) (O’Connor, J., joined by Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting)).
27. Id. at 523 (citing, inter alia, Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 317–18 (1980)).
28. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
29. Id. at 845–46.
30. Id. at 979 (Scalia, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and White & Thomas, JJ., dissenting).
31. Id. at 980.
32. Id. at 923 (Blackmun, J., joined by O’Connor, Kennedy & Souter, JJ., concurring in part, concurring
in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part).
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Justice Stevens, also supporting Roe, said that it protected a woman’s freedom
33
“to decide matters of the highest privacy and most personal nature.”
The outcome of the case thus depended on the views of Justices O’Connor,
Kennedy, and Souter. They adopted a moderate civil-libertarian position. The
joint opinion said:
Our law affords constitutional protection to personal decisions relating to
marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rearing,
and education. . . . These matters, involving the most intimate and
personal choices a person may make in a lifetime, choices central to
personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment. At the heart of liberty is the right to define one’s
own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the
34
mystery of human life.
The authors’ analysis stated the importance of individual liberty “combined
with the force of stare decisis” outweighed their reservations about “reaffirming
35
the central holding of Roe.” Here, stare decisis was not outweighed by any
concern about whether Roe was wrongly decided because the case has not proved
unworkable, people have relied on the decision, no evolution of legal principle
had weakened its doctrinal footings, its factual underpinnings remain intact, it
has been expressly reaffirmed several times, and overruling it might be perceived
36
as a surrender to political pressure.
Having refused to overrule the central principle that a woman has a right to
terminate her pregnancy before viability, the joint opinion substituted an “undue
burden” test for determining when the fundamental right had been violated—the
question being whether a state regulation has “the purpose or effect of placing a
substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable
37
fetus.” The opinion then applied that test to the state law in question, striking
down a requirement of spousal notification, but upholding, under rational review,
requirements of written informed consent, providing certain information to the
patient, a twenty-four-hour waiting period, record keeping, and a parental
consent provision for women under eighteen, with the opportunity to pursue a
38
judicial bypass.

33. Id. at 915 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
34. Id. at 851 (joint opinion of Justices O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter).
35. Id. at 853.
36. Id. at 854–61.
37. Id. at 877.
38. Id. at 874–901; see also Women’s Med. Prof’l Corp. v. Baird, 438 F.3d 595, 604–09 (6th Cir. 2006)
(finding state licensing provision requiring abortion clinic to have emergency transfer agreement with local
hospital, which may require clinic to close and thus force patients to travel to an alternative clinic roughly fifty
miles away, not an undue burden on abortion rights).
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The opinions of Justices Stevens and Blackmun in Casey followed Roe v.
Wade in its entirety, making every burden on abortion rights subject to strict
39
scrutiny, thereby constitutionalizing all regulations on abortion and following
40
Roe’s concern about specific harm if a pro-choice position were not adopted.
This approach differed from the more-moderate joint opinion in Casey, where the
Court did not sit as a super-legislature regarding all aspects of abortion
41
regulation. Thus, under Casey’s joint opinion, not every regulation of abortion
42
was constitutionalized under a strict scrutiny approach.
Justice Kennedy’s moderate civil-libertarian position on abortion rights is
also reflected in his opinions on the issue of a physical health exception. In
Stenberg v. Carhart, a 5–4 Court ruled that a Nebraska statute banning even
postviability, partial-birth abortions (where normally states can ban abortions to
advance the compelling interest of protecting the life of a viable fetus) was
unconstitutional as not having a sufficient exception for the life or substantial
health interests of the mother, as required in Roe, and modified by the “undue
43
burden” analysis in Casey. In dissent, Justice Kennedy concluded that the
Nebraska law’s medical emergency exception, as a less than undue burden on
44
choice, was sufficient to meet the maternal health exception required by Casey.
Reflecting a more conservative position, Justice Thomas, joined by Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justice Scalia, wrote a dissent calling for Roe and Casey to be
45
overturned.
Following Stenberg v. Carhart, Congress passed its own version of a partial46
birth abortion ban. In Gonzales v. Carhart, Justice Kennedy followed his dissent
in Stenberg v. Carhart and concluded that a congressional ban on partial-birth
abortions, like the Nebraska ban, was a less than undue burden on abortion rights
47
because it only limited one occasionally used means of abortion. Reflecting a

39. See id. at 911 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 922 (Blackmun, J.,
concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part).
40. Id. at 916–17 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 929–34 (Blackmun, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also id. at 927–28 (“[C]ompelled continuation of a pregnancy . . .
impos[es] substantial physical intrusions and significant risks of physical harm. . . . [M]otherhood has a
dramatic impact on a woman’s educational prospects, employment opportunities, and self-determination . . . .”);
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (“Maternity, or additional offspring, may force upon the woman a
distressful life and future. Psychological harm may be imminent. Mental and physical health may be taxed by
child care.”).
41. 505 U.S. at 874–901.
42. Compare id. at 934–40 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and
dissenting in part) (applying strict scrutiny to all of the legislative regulations in Casey), with id. at 879–901
(applying rational review to less than undue burdens on abortion choice; strict scrutiny applied only to undue
burdens).
43. 530 U.S. 914, 920–22, 930–31 (2000).
44. Id. at 956–58, 964 (Kennedy, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
45. Id. at 980–81 (Thomas, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and Scalia, J., dissenting).
46. 18 U.S.C. § 1531 (Supp. IV 2000).
47. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 150–64 (2007) (“Partial-birth abortions” are where part of the
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moderate civil-libertarian position, Justice Kennedy noted that Gonzales involved
a facial challenge to the statute, and thus, for all women seeking an abortion the
48
statute was not a substantial obstacle to abortion choice. This leaves open the
possibility of an as-applied challenge by a woman to whom the ban on a partial49
birth abortion would be a significant obstacle given her medical condition.
Regarding viability testing, while in 1973 the point of viability was typically
estimated to be around the twenty-eighth week of pregnancy, by 1989, increases
in medical technology had moved viability back to typically the twenty-fourth
50
week of pregnancy, where it remains as of 2012. Based on fetal lung capacity,
that point is not likely to change much in the future; although, in rare cases,
51
fetuses believed to be twenty weeks or older have survived premature births.
Statutes requiring doctors to perform a reasonable viability test on a fetus
believed to be in the twentieth week of pregnancy have been upheld, particularly
because the parties might be confused as to the time of conception, and thus more
52
likely viable.
While scholars have argued that choosing viability as a critical point in fetal
53
development is somewhat arbitrary, the Court’s justification for viability being
the point at which the state has a compelling interest in protecting potential life
has remained consistent since Roe. In Roe, the Court stated: “This is so because
the fetus then presumably has the capability of meaningful life outside the
mother’s womb. State regulation protective of fetal life after viability thus has
54
both logical and biological justifications.” The justification is based on the
belief that at viability, a fetus is an independent life, not necessarily part of the
55
mother’s body. Our traditions of protecting an individual’s rights guard against
56
due process and equal protection violations. Thus, prior to viability, there is no
57
individual, and the state’s interest in fetal life is legitimate but not compelling.
fetus is pulled intact through the cervix before being dismembered, rather than the standard abortion where the
fetal embryo is vacuumed out or the fetus is dismembered into pieces in the uterus behind the cervix before
being removed.).
48. Id. at 150–57.
49. Id. at 167–68. As they had in Stenberg, Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer viewed the
congressional partial-birth abortion ban as an undue burden on abortion rights, and therefore unconstitutional.
Id. at 169–71 (Ginsburg, J., joined by Stevens, Souter & Breyer, JJ., dissenting).
50. Id. at 150–57.
51. See id. at 134–40 (discussing the implications of the law depending on the point of viability).
52. See, e.g., Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 523–31 (1989) (O’Connor, J.,
concurring in part and concurring the judgment).
53. See Randy Beck, State Interests and the Duration of Abortion Rights, 44 MCGEORGE L. REV. 31
(2013).
54. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973).
55. Id. at 163–64.
56. See id. at 167–68 (discussing the historical protection of individual liberty).
57. The joint opinion in Casey underscored this reasoning. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505
U.S. 833, 870–71 (1992) (joint opinion of Justices O’Connor, Kennedy & Souter).
We conclude the line should be drawn at viability . . . . We adhere to this principle for two reasons.
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3. Property Under the Takings Clause
In Takings Clause cases, Justice Kennedy has also adopted a moderate civillibertarian approach. The Court applies a per se rule that any physical occupation
58
of property, no matter how minor, constitutes a takings. The only question
59
before the court is determining how much compensation must be paid.
In regulatory takings, however, there are two main issues of contention on
the Court. Justice Kennedy has joined the liberals in one area and the
conservatives in the other. The first issue is determining to what extent lost future
opportunities are taken into account, versus impact on existing uses. The leading
60
case on this issue is Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York. In
deciding the case, Justice Brennan focused on the character of the city’s action
61
and on the nature and extent of interference with rights in the parcel as a whole.
Focusing on the economic impact on the property as a whole, and not just on the
62
particular piece being regulated, is standard in Takings Clause doctrine. The
Court noted that even if the land-use law had “significantly diminished the value
63
of the Terminal site,” that was just the beginning of the analysis. In deciding
whether the challenger could prove that the diminution constituted a taking,
Justice Brennan pointed to the special significance of three factors: the economic
impact of a regulation, its interference with reasonable, investment-backed
64
expectations, and the character of the governmental action.

First, as we have said, is the doctrine of stare decisis. . . . The second reason is that the concept of
viability, as we noted in Roe, is the time at which there is a realistic possibility of maintaining and
nourishing a life outside the womb, so that the independent existence of the second life can in reason
and all fairness be the object of state protection that now overrides the rights of the woman. . . . On
the other side of the equation is the interest of the State in the protection of potential life. The Roe
Court recognized the State’s “important and legitimate interest in protecting the potentiality of
human life.”
Id. As a general matter, about sixty percent of the roughly 1.2 million abortions in the United States each year
take place within the first eight weeks of pregnancy; about nine in ten occur within the first twelve weeks; and
about one percent are performed after twenty weeks. PLANNED PARENTHOOD FEDERATION OF AMERICA, INC.,
ABORTION AFTER THE FIRST TRIMESTER IN THE UNITED STATES (Sept. 2010), available at http://www.
plannedparenthood.org/files/PPFA/fact_abortion_1st_tri_2010-09.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
Abortions performed after twenty-six weeks, when the fetus is likely viable, is extremely rare. Abortion After
Twelve Weeks, NAT’L ABORTION FED’N, http://www.prochoice.org/about_abortion/facts/after_12_weeks.html
(last revised 2003) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). Almost inevitably, these are done in the context of
substantial health risks to the mother or fetal defects not diagnosed until late in the pregnancy. Id.
58. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 427 (1982).
59. For example, in Loretto, the Court held that the mere placement of a cable box on the roof of an
apartment building constituted a taking. Id. at 425–28.
60. 438 U.S. 104, 124, 130–36 (1978).
61. Id. at 142.
62. See generally Christopher S. Kiefer, Reconciling the Internal Inconsistency and Resolving the
Denominator Problem in Takings Law, 10 BOSTON U. PUB. INT. L.J. 171, 176–79 (2000).
63. Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 130–31.
64. Id.
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Justice Rehnquist took the conservative position in his dissent, saying the lost
opportunity of using the air rights above the railroad station should be given
65
greater weight in this balancing approach. Focusing on the profits lost by being
denied the ability to use the air rights to build the fifty-story tower, the dissent
concluded that the regulation went “too far” and constituted a taking of those
rights from the property owner that was not offset by the ability to use the air
rights on other buildings or the increase in value of Grand Central Terminal
66
attributable to similar land-use restrictions on neighboring properties. Because
Justice Kennedy has never adopted this more conservative, pro-property owner
analysis, it is not the majority opinion on the Court today. Of course, where a
67
complete deprivation of economically viable uses exists, a taking occurs.
The second issue involves whether to apply Penn Central to a case involving
a government exaction of property rights tailored for a specific individual. Here,
Justice Kennedy has joined with the conservatives. In Dolan v. Tigard, the Court
held that where a city conditions the approval of a building permit on an
individual parcel on the owner giving up some property rights, the city has the
burden to show not only that the “‘essential nexus’ exists between the ‘legitimate
state interest’ and the permit condition,” but also that the degree of the exaction
by the city bears a “rough proportionality” to the projected impact of the
68
proposed development. The Court said, “No precise mathematical calculation is
required, but the city must make some sort of individualized determination that
the required dedication is related both in nature and extent to the impact of the
69
proposed development.” Four Justices dissented in Dolan. Both of the
dissents—one by Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Blackmun and Ginsburg;
one by Justice Souter—disagreed with the majority that the burden should have
70
been shifted to the government in this case and would have applied the standard
71
Penn Central analysis.
Another Takings Clause issue involves whether the taking is for a public use.
As Justice O’Connor noted in her dissent in 2005 in Kelo v. City of New London,
clear examples of public use involve transferring “private property to public
ownership—such as for a road, a hospital, or a military base” or transferring
65. Id. at 142–43 (Rehnquist, J., joined by Burger, C.J., and Stewart, J., dissenting).
66. Id. at 138–40.
67. For example, in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015–16 (1992), a statute,
as applied, barred a property owner from erecting any permanent habitable structures on beachfront property.
The Court held that this would be a taking if it deprived the owner of all economically beneficial uses of the
property. Id. The Court reaffirmed this per se rule that a taking will occur for complete deprivations of property
value in Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A, Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 538 (2005), holding that a complete deprivation of value
is the equivalent of a physical occupation.
68. 512 U.S. 374, 385–91 (1994).
69. Id. at 391.
70. Id. at 396–407 (Stevens, J., joined by Blackmun & Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting); id. at 411–14 (Souter,
J., dissenting).
71. Id.
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“private property to private parties, often common carriers, who make the
property available for the public’s use—such as with a railroad, a public utility,
72
or a stadium.” Justice O’Connor noted, however, that these two categories of
“‘public ownership’ and ‘use-by-the-public’ are sometimes too constricting and
73
impractical.” Under some exigent circumstances, the Court has therefore
allowed “takings that serve a public purpose also [to] satisfy the Constitution
74
even if the property is destined for subsequent private use.” Regardless, in Kelo,
Justice O’Connor concluded that a case of eminent domain to aid a private
developer to build a waterfront project could not be defined as for a “public
75
use.”
The Kelo majority read the third category of “public purpose” takings more
76
broadly. They noted, “[O]ur cases have defined that concept broadly, reflecting
our longstanding policy of deference to legislative judgments . . . . Promoting
economic development is a traditional and long-accepted function of
77
government.”
In his concurrence, Justice Kennedy adopted a moderate position between
Justice O’Connor’s dissent and the majority. He observed:
This Court has declared that a taking should be upheld as consistent
with the Public Use Clause, as long as it is “rationally related to a
conceivable public purpose.” . . . The determination that a rational-basis
standard of review is appropriate does not, however, alter the fact that
transfers intended to confer benefits on particular, favored private
entities, and with only incidental or pretextual public benefits, are
78
forbidden by the Public Use Clause.
B. The Freedom of Speech
From his numerous free-speech opinions, three general principles emerge as
the basis for Justice Kennedy’s belief that freedom of speech was intended to
have, and deserves, much protection from action by all branches of state and
federal government. These three principles, based on eighteenth century

72. 545 U.S. 469, 497–98 (2005) (O’Connor, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and Scalia & Thomas, JJ.,
dissenting).
73. Id. at 498.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 498–502.
76. Id. at 480, 484.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 490 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citations omitted). On Justice Kennedy’s approach to the
Takings Clause generally, see John G. Sprankling, The Property Jurisprudence of Justice Kennedy, 44
MCGEORGE L. REV. 61 (2013).
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Enlightenment philosophy, are supporting political freedom; supporting
79
individual autonomy; and protecting freedom to teach, learn, and innovate.
80
Justice Kennedy has been a strong protector of free-speech rights. He has
been particularly influential in cases dealing with viewpoint discrimination, such
81
as Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia. In
Rosenberger, the university was paying the printing costs for a variety of
publications by certified student organizations, but on Establishment Clause
grounds refused to pay for a student paper that promoted “a particular belie[f] in
82
or about a deity or an ultimate reality.” Joined by the more conservative
Justices, and writing for a 5–4 Court, Justice Kennedy said that this was
viewpoint discrimination, since the university did not exclude religion as a
subject matter, but imposed disfavored treatment on the student journalistic
83
efforts that had religious editorial viewpoints. Justice Kennedy also wrote the
84
majority opinion in Legal Services Corporation v. Velasquez. In Velasquez,
85
Justice Kennedy was joined by the more liberal Justices in a 5–4 opinion. The
Court held that where the government funds lawyers who are to speak on behalf
of their clients, the government may not “foreclose[] advice or legal assistance to
86
question the validity of statutes under the Constitution . . . .”
Justice Kennedy has championed students’ free-speech rights. In Morse v.
Frederick, the Supreme Court indicated that rational review applies to student
speech made in the context of the non-public forum of a “school-sanctioned and
87
school-supervised” event. The Court held that the school had a legitimate
interest in regulating speech that could rationally be viewed as promoting illegal
88
drug use. Justices Kennedy and Alito concurred, and their votes were critical to

79. See generally ROGERS M. SMITH, LIBERALISM AND AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 92–95 (1985)
(discussing eighteenth century liberalism and the freedom of speech in terms of “freedom of conscience,” which
was used to support “personal liberty” and “intellectual progress,” as well as the “political function” of freedom
of speech to expose the “mischief” of politicians).
80. See Ashutosh Bhagwat & Matthew Struhar, Justice Kennedy’s Free Speech Jurisprudence: A
Quantitative and Qualitative Analysis, 44 MCGEORGE L. REV. 167 (2013); Charles D. Kelso & R. Randall
Kelso, The Constitutional Jurisprudence of Justice Kennedy on Speech, 49 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 693 (2012).
81. 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
82. Id. at 822–28 (alteration in original).
83. Id. at 828–37. For four Justices in dissent, Justice Souter said that there was no viewpoint
discrimination because the university had simply denied funding for the subject matter of religious speech. Id. at
863–64 (Souter, J., joined by Stevens, Ginsburg & Breyer, JJ., dissenting).
84. 531 U.S. 533 (2001).
85. Id. at 535.
86. Id. at 540–49. For four Justices in dissent, Justice Scalia viewed the government’s action as
involving government spending of its own funds, not regulating other person’s speech, and thus subject only to
minimum rationality review. Id. at 549–52 (Scalia, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and O’Connor & Thomas, JJ.,
dissenting).
87. 551 U.S. 393, 393, 408–10 (2007).
88. Id.
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make up the majority. Their concurring opinion indicated that the more rigorous
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District test would apply
to student-generated speech that was not connected to the school curriculum,
90
even if the speech conflicted with the “educational mission” of the school.
In some cases, where the Court had concluded that the regulation was
content-neutral, Justice Kennedy disagreed and concluded the regulation was in
fact content-based. For example, in Hill v. Colorado, while the Court found that
an injunction that affected abortion protesters was content neutral, Justice
Kennedy recommended that the Court should break through the form of a speech
regulation to the reality—that only one side of the abortion debate was being
91
regulated.
C. Criminal Procedure Doctrine
In cases involving criminal procedure, Justice Kennedy has been sensitive to
92
the needs of police enforcement and to traditional constitutional doctrine
93
regarding criminal procedural practice. In contrast, he has joined liberals in
moderate civil-libertarian positions in death-penalty cases. For example, in Atkins
v. Virginia, a 6–3 Court, including Justice Kennedy, discussed evolving societal
practice to hold unconstitutional the death penalty for mentally retarded
94
criminals. A similar pattern of voting occurred in 2005 in Roper v. Simmons,
where the Court ruled that executing persons under eighteen was cruel and
95
unusual punishment. Roper overruled the decision in Stanford v Kentucky,
which permitted the execution of persons under eighteen in some
96
circumstances. Even before Stanford, the Court had ruled in Thompson v.
97
Oklahoma that it was unconstitutional for persons under sixteen to be executed.

89. Id. at 422–25 (Kennedy & Alito, JJ., concurring).
90. Id. (citing Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 508–09 (1969)) (noting that
under Tinker the school must show a concern with “substantial disruption” of the school environment, which
reflects the intermediate review requirement of a substantial government interest to regulate, not a mere rational
review approach).
91. 530 U.S. 703 (2000); id. at 768–70 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); see also id. at 741–42 (Scalia, J.,
joined by Thomas, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Court today continues and expands its assault upon their individual
right to persuade women contemplating abortion that what they are doing is wrong.”).
92. See, e.g., Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 132 S. Ct. 1510 (2012) (holding a strip search
constitutional of individual arrested on outstanding bench warrant after traffic stop).
93. See Stephanos Bibas, Justice Kennedy’s Sixth Amendment Pragmatism, 44 MCGEORGE L. REV. 211
(2013).
94. 536 U.S. 304, 316 n.21 (2002).
95. 543 U.S. 551, 560–78 (2005), overruling Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989).
96. Roper, 543 U.S. at 560–78, overruling Stanford, 492 U.S. at 380. It should be noted that Justice
Kennedy joined the majority in Stanford, id. at 364, but shifted his vote in Roper, perhaps based on the fact that
fewer states authorized the death penalty for minors by 2005 than in 1989.
97. 487 U.S. 815, 838 (1988).
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In Kennedy v. Louisiana, a 5–4 Court held that the Eighth Amendment bars
imposition of the death penalty for the rape of a child where the crime did not
98
cause, and was not intended to cause, the victim’s death. Justice Kennedy,
joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, reasoned that the “cruel
and unusual punishment” clause of the Eighth Amendment requires that
punishment for crime be proportional to the offense, determined in terms of
evolving societal standards rather than by standards prevailing when the
99
Amendment was adopted. Those standards are determined by national
consensus (considering the history of the Amendment, judicial precedents,
legislative enactments, and state practice), and by the Court’s own independent
100
judgment. Justice Alito dissented, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices
101
Scalia and Thomas.
In Graham v. Florida, the Court considered the constitutionality of life
102
imprisonment without parole for juveniles. Justice Kennedy had observed in
Roper v. Simmons that juveniles “cannot with reliability be classified among the
worst offenders” because of: “[a] lack of maturity and an underdeveloped sense
of responsibility”; “juveniles are more vulnerable or susceptible to negative
influences and outside pressures, including peer pressure”; and the “personality
103
traits of juveniles are more transitory, less fixed.” These observations support
the notion that life imprisonment without parole is not an appropriate punishment
for juvenile offenders, particularly for non-homicide offenses. In Graham v.
Florida, following a Roper-like analysis, Justice Kennedy joined with Justices
Stevens, Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor to hold unconstitutional life
104
imprisonment without parole for juveniles for non-homicide offenses.

98. 554 U.S. 407, 412 (2008).
99. Id. at 434–38.
100. Id. at 418–26.
101. Id. at 447 (Alito, J., joined by Roberts, C.J., and Scalia & Thomas, JJ., dissenting). Following the
decision, it emerged that under the Military Code of Justice the death penalty is authorized for rape of a child
when done by military personnel. This additional example of a government entity having a provision, not used
in recent history, made no real difference in terms of the case outcome. Kennedy v. Louisiana, 129 S. Ct. 1, 1–3
(2008) (petition for rehearing denied). Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion was driven by an evolving consensus
regarding standards of decency, and not the erroneous conclusion that no federal law imposes the death penalty
for rape.
102. 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010).
103. 543 U.S. 551, 569–70 (2005) (alteration in original) (internal quotations omitted).
104. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2023–30. Chief Justice Roberts agreed that a life sentence without parole for
the armed burglary in this case was unconstitutional, but was unwilling to adopt the majority’s absolute rule
applicable to any non-homicide offense. Id. at 2039–40 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in the judgment). In dissent,
focused on text and specific historical intent, Justice Thomas, joined by Justices Scalia and Alito, noted that
“the text of the Constitution is silent regarding the permissibility of this sentencing practice, and . . . it would
not have offended the standards that prevailed at the founding.” Id. at 2043 (Thomas, J., joined by Scalia, J., and
Alito, J., as to Parts I and III). On these death-penalty cases generally, see Linda E. Carter, The Evolution of
Justice Kennedy’s Eighth Amendment Jurisprudence on Categorical Bars in Capital Cases, 44 MCGEORGE L.
REV. 229 (2013).
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D. Structural Issues
Two kinds of structural issues exist regarding the federal government. First,
there are separation of powers issues regarding federal legislative, executive, and
judicial powers. Second, there are federalism issues regarding the power of the
federal government vis-à-vis the power of the States.
1. Separation of Powers
The most significant separation of powers cases for Justice Kennedy have
involved the “war on terrorism.” In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, a case involving a United
States citizen enemy combatant, a plurality of Justice O’Connor, joined by Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justices Kennedy and Breyer, concluded that “although
Congress authorized the detention of combatants in the narrow circumstances
alleged here, due process demands that a citizen held in the United States as an
enemy combatant be given a meaningful opportunity to contest the factual basis
105
for that detention before a neutral decisionmaker.” Reflecting a moderate civillibertarian position, the plurality noted:
Without doubt, our Constitution recognizes that core strategic matters of
warmaking belong in the hands of those who are best positioned and
most politically accountable for making them. The Government also
argues . . . that . . . military officers who are engaged in the serious work
of waging battle would be unnecessarily and dangerously distracted by
litigation half a world away, and discovery into military operations
would both intrude on the sensitive secrets of national defense and result
in a futile search for evidence buried under the rubble of war. To the
extent that these burdens are triggered by heightened procedures, they
106
are properly taken into account in our due process analysis.
Adopting a more conservative position, Justice Thomas agreed with the
plurality in Hamdi that Congress had authorized military detention, but granted
107
the President greater power to engage in unilateral action. Four Justices

105. 542 U.S. 507, 508 (2004) (O’Connor, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and Kennedy & Breyer, JJ.,
plurality).
106. Id. at 531–32 (citations omitted).
107. Id. at 579 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“This detention falls squarely within the Federal Government’s
war powers, and we lack the expertise and capacity to second-guess that decision. . . . Arguably, Congress could
provide for additional procedural protections, but until it does, we have no right to insist upon them.”).
Following the Hamdi case, the government chose to release Mr. Hamdi, rather than prosecute him. His release
was based on an agreement that he would give up his United States citizenship, relocate in another country,
Saudi Arabia, and consent not to travel to an extensive list of countries, including Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, or
Syria, where he could be presumably be recruited for terrorist activity. Jerry Markon, Hamdi Returned to Saudi
Arabia, WASH. POST, Oct. 12, 2004, at A02.
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dissented. Justice Scalia read the Suspension Clause, Article I, Section nine,
Clause three, to give the Congress no independent power to authorize military
detentions of United States citizens absent suspension of the writ of habeas
109
corpus, a position Justice Stevens joined. Adopting a less extreme position,
Justices Souter and Ginsburg required a clear statement from Congress to
110
authorize such detentions, which they said did not exist.
The issue of what rights non-United States citizens held at Guantanamo Bay
111
should have in their trials was the focus of Hamdan v. Rumsfeld. In Hamdan,
the Court decided that no congressional act had expressly authorized the initial
set of procedures adopted by the Bush Administration to try detainees at
112
Guantanamo Bay. Absent such congressional authorization, the procedures
violated existing statutory and treaty requirements: the Uniform Code of Military
113
Justice (UCMJ) and Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions. As Justice Kennedy
pointed out in his concurrence, the UCMJ and Article 3 of the Geneva
114
Conventions require that military commissions be “regularly constituted.” Such
commissions are not established, he said, unless the government is prepared to
explain why practical reasons require any differences between their structure and
115
procedures and those used by courts-martial. The Court held that Article 3 of
the Geneva Conventions applied because it regulates any “conflict not of an
international character occurring in the territory of one of the High Contracting
116
Parties.” The Court concluded that because acts by terrorists are not acts
between “nations,” they are conflicts “not of an international character” as that
117
phrase is used in the Geneva Conventions.
A conservative dissent by Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Scalia and
joined in part by Justice Alito, would have granted greater deference to the
118
president. In part of his dissent, Justice Thomas concluded that Article 3 of the
Geneva Conventions did not apply, in part because the Court should defer to the
president’s judgment that because the war on terrorism was “international in
scope” it was a conflict “of an international character” for purposes of the

108. Id. at 539 (Souter, J., joined by Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part, and concurring
in the judgment); id. at 554 (Scalia, J., joined by Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 579 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
109. Id. at 554 (Scalia, J., joined by Stevens, J., dissenting).
110. Id. at 540 (Souter, J., joined by Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part, and concurring
in the judgment).
111. 548 U.S. 557 (2006).
112. Id. at 567.
113. Id. at 565–67, 590–95, 628–32.
114. Id. at 629, 632 (internal quotation marks omitted).
115. Id. at 636–38 (Kennedy, J., joined by Souter, Ginsburg & Breyer, JJ., as to Parts I & II, concurring
in part).
116. Id. at 637.
117. Id. at 629–32.
118. Id. at 629.
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Geneva Conventions. In a separate dissent, Justice Alito noted that even if
Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions applied, it imposes only three requirements:
“Sentences may be imposed only by (1) a ‘court,’ (2) that is ‘regularly
constituted,’ and (3) that affords ‘all the judicial guarantees which are recognized
120
as indispensable by civilized peoples.’” The commissions created by the
president met this standard, concluded Justice Alito, and there is no basis for the
Court to strike down the commissions because their rules can be changed from
time to time by the Secretary of Defense or that evidence may be admitted which
121
has probative value to a reasonable person.
In response to Hamdan, Congress passed, and President Bush signed, the
Military Commissions Act of 2006, which set out procedures to govern trial of
122
unlawful enemy combatants. The Act defined enemy combatants broadly as
any foreign national individual that the president, or presidential designate, to
have “purposefully and materially” supported anti-United States hostilities and is
123
not part of a country’s regular armed forces. The ad hoc nature of the existing
process before this statute was passed had naturally caused due process
124
problems. In the Act, Congress expanded the evidence that could be used at
trial from traditional UCMJ procedures—both hearsay evidence and evidence
from coerced confessions (although not from torture), as long as the evidence
125
meets a generic test of “probative value to a reasonable person.” The Act
provided, however, for a ban on any habeas corpus petition filed by a non-United
126
States citizen detainee, instead opting for a more limited review.
In
Boumediene v. Bush, a 5–4 Court, held that aliens designated as enemy
combatants and detained at Guantanamo Bay have the constitutional right of
habeas corpus, and the procedures in the Military Commissions Act were an
127
inadequate substitute. Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, reasoned that
the procedures in the Military Commissions Act were inadequate because the

119. Id. at 718–19 (Thomas, J., joined by Scalia, J., and by Alito, J., except for Parts I, II.C.1, and
III.B.2, dissenting).
120. Id. at 726 (Alito, J., joined by Scalia & Thomas, JJ., as to Parts I, II, & III, dissenting).
121. Id. at 726–30.
122. Military Commissions Act of 2006, 28 U.S.C. § 2241(e) (Supp. II 2006) (amended 2008).
123. Id.
124. See Haley A. Andrews, How Far Is Too Far?: The Supreme Court’s Response to the Executive
Attempt to Improvise Constitutional Procedures During the War on Terror, 36 CUMB. L. REV. 123 (2005);
Christopher C. Burris, Time for Congressional Action: The Necessity of Delineating the Jurisdictional
Responsibilities of Federal District Courts, Courts-Martial, and Military Commission to Try Violations of the
Laws of War, 2005 FED. CTS. L. REV. 4 (2005); Randolph N. Jonakait, Rasul v. Bush: Unanswered Questions,
13 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1129 (2005).
125. Military Commissions Act of 2006, 28 U.S.C. § 2241(e) (Supp. II 2006) (amended 2008).
126. Id.; Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, 119 Stat. 2739.
127. 553 U.S. 723, 792 (2008).
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detainee is not allowed to present exculpatory evidence after the proceedings
128
concluded, as would be needed for a Court of Appeals to make findings of fact.
In dissent, Chief Justice Roberts, joined by Justices Scalia, Thomas, and
Alito, criticized Justice Kennedy’s opinion for not being sufficiently deferential
129
to decisions by Congress and military authorities. Chief Justice Roberts said
that the system created by Congress protects whatever rights the detainees may
130
possess. As for use of later-discovered evidence, Chief Justice Roberts noted
that the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia has the power to remand a
131
case to the tribunal below to allow that body to consider such evidence.
Since Boumediene, a number of cases involving enemy combatants have
been tried. In a number of these cases, courts have ordered detainees released due
to a lack of evidence even under flexible evidentiary standards suggested in
132
Hamdan and Boumediene. In other cases, courts have ordered individuals
detained and held that the procedures adopted in the Military Commissions Act
satisfy due process concerns, including a preponderance of the evidence standard
to determine guilt; use of hearsay testimony, as long as it is “reliable”; and
133
reasonable discovery procedures.
2. Federalism
In 1976, a 5–4 Court held in National League of Cities v. Usery that the
Tenth Amendment prohibits Congress, when exercising its Commerce Clause
power, from directly displacing a state’s freedom to structure integral operations
134
in areas of traditional governmental functions. Four liberal Justices dissented in
135
National League. The critical fifth vote in National League belonged to Justice
136
Blackmun. In National League, Justice Blackmun balanced the demands of
federal versus state power, creating an area for state sovereignty, but noted that
federal power should not be outlawed “in areas such as environmental protection,
where the federal interest is demonstrably greater and where state facility
137
compliance with imposed federal standards would be essential.”
In Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, Justice Blackmun
abandoned his National League balancing approach, a mere nine years after

128. Id. at 787–92.
129. Id. at 801, 821 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
130. Id. at 822.
131. Id. at 801–03, 816–22 (Roberts, C.J., joined by Scalia, Thomas & Alito, JJ., dissenting).
132. See, e.g., Latif v. Obama, 666 F.3d 746, 764 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
133. See, e.g., Al-Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
134. 426 U.S. 833, 851 (1976).
135. Id. at 856, 867–68 (Brennan, J., joined by White & Marshall, JJ., dissenting); id. at 880–81
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
136. Id. at 856 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
137. Id.
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National League was decided. In Garcia, he joined the liberal dissenters in
National League to overrule National League in favor of a strong, pro-federal
139
power decision. Justice Blackmun said in his opinion for the Court that it was
unworkable to seek limits on Congress’s power in terms of particular
governmental functions, whether “traditional,” “integral,” “ordinary,” or
140
“necessary.” Such distinctions merely invite judges to decide on what state
141
policies they favor or dislike. Blackmun noted that any Tenth Amendment
limits on Congress’s Commerce Clause power are in the procedural safeguards
inherent in the structure and political processes of the federal system, including
the lobbying ability of groups like the National Governors’ Association, the
National Conference of State Legislatures, the U.S. Conference of Mayors, or the
142
Council of State Governments.
Despite conservative Justices typically having a strong states’ rights
predisposition when deciding cases, during his tenure on the Court, Justice
Kennedy has shown no willingness to reconsider this holding in Garcia. This is
true despite four more conservative Justices on the Court today, no doubt willing
to overrule Garcia, similar to the four conservative Justices in dissent in
143
Garcia.
Despite Garcia’s Tenth Amendment doctrine, states’ rights have been
indirectly enhanced after Garcia in two ways. First, in Gregory v. Ashcroft, the
Court held that Congress needs to make a clear statement in federal statutes for
144
those statutes to apply to states also. The majority opinion, authored by Justice
O’Connor, was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices Scalia, Kennedy,
145
and Souter. Second, the moderate conservative Justices have carved out some
meaning for the Tenth Amendment by banning federal commandeering of state
legislative, executive, or administrative agencies.
In New York v. United States, Justice O’Connor wrote for a 6–3 Court,
including Justices Kennedy and Souter, that “Congress may not simply
‘commandee[r] the legislative processes of the States by directly compelling
146
them to enact and enforce a federal regulatory program.’” This doctrine is
147
based upon the dual theory of sovereignty. Under that theory, as explained by
Justice Kennedy in United States Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, the genius of our

138. 469 U.S. 528, 530–31 (1985) (Blackmun, J., for the Court) (Fair Labor Standards Act can be
applied to city bus drivers).
139. Id. at 529.
140. Id. at 546–47.
141. Id. at 547.
142. Id. at 547–54.
143. Id. at 557–60 (Powell, J., joined by Burger, C.J., and Rehnquist & O’Connor, JJ., dissenting).
144. 501 U.S. 452, 460–61 (1991).
145. Id. at 454.
146. 505 U.S. 144, 161 (1992) (alteration in original).
147. Id. at 155–59.
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founding generation was to split sovereignty in the United States system into two
148
parts: states and federal government. As Chief Justice Marshall had noted in
McCulloch v. Maryland, the founding generation established dual systems of
government, each deriving its authority independently from the consent of the
149
people. After all, the Constitution provides, in the first three words, “We, the
150
People,” not “We, the States.” Further, the Constitution was ratified in special
state conventions elected specially by the people for that purpose, not ratified by
151
the existing state legislatures. Thus, in our system, there are two sovereign
entities, the federal government and the states, linked by the Constitution’s
Supremacy Clause of Article VI, Section two.
Under this dual theory of sovereignty, the federal government can regulate
both individuals and states where constitutional power exists under the United
States Constitution, and states can regulate individuals and the federal
government under their own state constitutions and the United States
152
Constitution consistent with doctrines of intergovernmental immunity.
However, the federal government cannot tell the states in any manner how they
should regulate their own people because that would infringe on the states’
153
reserved sovereign power.
The 5–4 decision in Printz v. United States extended the theory of New York
154
v. United States. There, the Court held that Congress could not require state
officials to conduct a background check on persons who had applied to purchase
155
a gun. Relying on the dual theory of sovereignty, history, and legislative and
executive practice, the Court concluded that just as Congress could not
commandeer the state legislature in New York, Congress cannot commandeer
156
state executive or administrative officials. However, the Court suggested
strongly in dicta in Printz, that Congress can commandeer state judges to enforce
157
the United States Constitution. This is based on the view of the Framers and
Ratifiers’ expectations that, given no federal court system under the Articles of
Confederation and no requirement that Congress create lower federal courts, state

148.
149.
150.
151.

514 U.S. 779, 838–44 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Id. at 839 (citing McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 316 (1819)).
U.S. CONST. pmbl.
Thornton, 514 U.S. at 846; see also U.S. NAT’L ARCHIVES & RECORDS ADMIN., TEACHING WITH
DOCUMENTS: THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, available at http://www.archives.gov/education/
lessons/constitution-day/ratification.html (last visited Sept. 16, 2012) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
152. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 457 (1990).
153. Id.
154. 521 U.S. 898, 908–12 (1997).
155. Id. at 935.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 905–07.
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courts would be the primary initial enforcers of federal constitutional and
158
statutory rights.
The Court has made it clear that the New York and Printz cases apply only
where Congress attempts to “use” or “commandeer” state officials for federal
159
purposes. These cases pose no Tenth Amendment limit on Congress’s power to
160
regulate states or individuals directly. Thus, in Reno v. Condon, a federal act
barring unconsented disclosure of drivers’ license information was applied to
161
both the states and private persons. The Court stated that New York and Printz
did not apply where the federal exercise of Commerce Clause power regulated
state activities directly, rather than seeking to control or influence the manner in
162
which the states regulated private parties. In Condon, because the federal
statute regulated state workers at the state’s Department of Motor Vehicles and
did not tell those workers how to regulate their own citizens, the federal act was
163
constitutional.
III. KENNEDY AS A CONSERVATIVE JUSTICE
In a few areas, Justice Kennedy has tended to join with the conservative
Justices on the Court. The most prominent areas are: (1) state sovereign
immunity cases, (2) the Bush v. Gore election case, (3) cases involving the
Second Amendment right to bear arms, (4) campaign finance litigation, (5) the
constitutionality of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (Obamacare),
and (6) affirmative action cases.
A. State Sovereign Immunity
In Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., the Court held 5–4 that Congress can
create federal court actions against states for damages caused by acting under the
164
Commerce Clause. Justice Scalia’s dissenting opinion, joined by Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices O’Connor and Kennedy, said that Hans v. Louisiana
165
declared otherwise. That case, Justice Scalia said, broadly held that despite the
limited text of the Eleventh Amendment, federal jurisdiction over unconsenting
states “was not contemplated by the Constitution when establishing the judicial

158. Id. at 903–08.
159. Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141, 150–51 (2000).
160. Id. at 149 (quoting New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 162 (1992)).
161. Id. at 146.
162. Id. at 149–51.
163. Id. at 151.
164. 491 U.S. 1, 13–23 (1989).
165. Id. at 32 (Scalia, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and O’Connor & Kennedy, JJ., dissenting) (citing
Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 15 (1890)).
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power of the United States.” Justice Scalia observed that there was no need to
state that conclusion in the Eleventh Amendment itself, since it was a
167
background principle of wide acceptance.
The dissenters in Union Gas, joined by newly appointed Justice Thomas,
168
voted to overrule Union Gas in Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida. In
Seminole Tribe, Justice Stevens, dissenting, said the Eleventh Amendment
169
applies only to suits premised on diversity jurisdiction. Justice Souter,
dissenting, joined Justices Ginsburg and Breyer, also took issue with the holding
in Hans “that a State could plead sovereign immunity against a noncitizen suing
under federal-question jurisdiction, and for that reason a State must enjoy the
170
same protection in a suit by one of its citizens.” Justice Souter explored
historical materials to show that even those framers who expected common-law
immunity to survive ratification were talking about diversity jurisdiction, not
immunity of a state against the general federal-question jurisdiction of the
171
national courts. Justice Souter concluded government action should not be
trumped by judicially discoverable principles “untethered” to any written
172
provision.
Despite the dissent’s analysis, a majority of the Court, including Justice
173
Kennedy, have adhered to Seminole Tribe. Indeed, the Court extended
Seminole Tribe through several cases, further limiting Congress’s power to
abrogate state sovereign immunity by use of Congress’s Section five power to
174
enforce the Fourteenth Amendment. The most important of these cases is City
175
of Boerne v. Flores. In a 5–4 decision, Justice Kennedy wrote that Section five
authorized Congress only to remedy or prevent unconstitutional actions by
176
states. Under Section five, Congress could not make a substantive change in the
177
governing law. Justice Kennedy said that “[t]here must be a congruence and
proportionality between the injury to be prevented or remedied and the means
178
adopted to that end.” Applying that test, Justice Kennedy examined the
legislative record of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, which purported to
require strict scrutiny, rather than rational basis, of all state action that

166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.

Id.
Id. at 31–32.
517 U.S. 44 (1996).
Id. at 76–78 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id. at 102 (Souter, J., joined by Ginsburg & Breyer, JJ., dissenting).
Id. at 100–85.
Id. at 117.
See, e.g., City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
See, e.g., id.
Id.
Id. at 518–20.
Id.
Id. at 520.
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substantially burdens religious exercise. Justice Kennedy said the legislative
record lacked examples of modern instances of generally applicable laws passed
180
because of religious bigotry. Thus, Justice Kennedy concluded that the Act was
“so out of proportion to . . . [any] remedial or preventive object that it . . . [was
not] responsive to, or designed to prevent, unconstitutional behavior,” and was an
181
attempt to make a substantive change in the law.
Applying the “congruence and proportionality test,” the Court has held
subsequently that the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) was not
“appropriate” legislation under Section five of the Fourteenth Amendment,
because there was no evidence of a sufficient pattern of state discrimination on
the basis of age to which the statute would be a “congruent and proportionate”
182
response. Thus, the Court held that Congress could not abrogate state sovereign
immunity in the case, because Congress has no power to abrogate state sovereign
immunity if the statute were viewed as only authorized under the Commerce
183
Clause, as opposed to the Fourteenth Amendment. Similar results have been
reached in other cases involving the power of Congress to abrogate state
sovereign immunity under Congress’s Section five enforcement power, where the
underlying regulatory legislation is based on the Commerce Clause power or
184
other Article One authority. In each of these cases, Justices Stevens, Souter,
Ginsburg, and Breyer dissented, concluding that the legislation was “appropriate”
under a proper definition of “appropriate” and not the majority’s heightened
185
“congruence and proportionality” standard.
In two cases, Congress was able to establish that the remedial schemes were
186
“congruent and proportional.” These cases dealt with the Family and Medical
187
Leave Act’s provision for unpaid leave and the Americans with Disabilities Act
188
regulating access to state courthouses. In determining whether sufficient
evidence exists to establish a pattern of state constitutional violations, Chief
Justice Rehnquist noted in Nevada Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs,
the Family and Medical Leave Act case, that where “the standard for

179. Id. at 529, 532–36.
180. Id. at 530–31.
181. Id. at 529–36.
182. Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 82–83, 86 (2000) (ADEA case).
183. Id.
184. See generally Bd. of Trustees of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001) (holding no civil
action can arise against a state under Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary
Educ. Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999) (Patent Clause); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598
(2000) (Commerce Clause).
185. See, e.g., Garrett, 531 U.S. at 386–89 (Breyer, J., joined by Stevens, Souter & Ginsburg, JJ.,
dissenting).
186. See Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509 (2004); Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721
(2003).
187. Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 721.
188. Lane, 541 U.S. at 509.
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demonstrating the constitutionality of [government action] is more difficult to
meet than our rational-basis test,” such as the intermediate scrutiny used to test
cases of gender discrimination, it is “easier for Congress to show a pattern of
189
state constitutional violations.” Even with regard to the mentally or physically
disabled under the Americans with Disabilities Act, an area of rational basis
scrutiny, the Court concluded in Tennessee v. Lane that there was sufficient
evidence of state lack of compliance with the equal protection rights of disabled
persons to equal access to state courthouses that the Americans with Disabilities
Act was a “congruent and proportionate” response to state failures to build ramps
190
to their numerous, but often old, county courthouses. In both of these cases,
however, Justice Kennedy dissented and found no grounds to abrogate state
191
sovereign immunity. In a recent case under the Family and Medical Leave
Act’s self-care provision, Justice Kennedy again provided the critical fifth vote to
192
find no grounds to abrogate state sovereign immunity.
B. Bush v. Gore
The most noteworthy case involving equal protection issues and the right to
vote during Justice Kennedy’s tenure on the Court is unquestionably Bush v.
193
Gore. In this case, the Court considered the constitutionality of the Florida
Supreme Court’s recount decision in the 2000 Presidential election between
194
Governor George W. Bush and Vice President Al Gore. One concern was the
195
Florida Supreme Court’s decision to recount only “undervotes” but not
196
“overvotes.” A second concern was with the differing ways Florida counties
chose to count the undervotes, some viewing an indentation as being sufficient to
determine voter intent, while other counties required the card to be punched
197
through. All of these issues were critical because under the original certified

189. Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 736.
190. Lane, 541 U.S. at 533–34.
191. Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 744 (Kennedy, J., joined by Scalia & Thomas, JJ., dissenting); Lane, 541 U.S. at
538 (Rehnquist, C.J., joined by Kennedy & Thomas, JJ., dissenting). Justice Scalia also dissented in Lane. Id. at
554 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
192. Coleman v. Ct. of App. of Md., 132 S. Ct. 1327, 1332 (2012).
193. 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
194. Id. at 100–03.
195. “Undervotes” can occur if the machine does not register a vote, as would occur if the voter had
punched the punch card but either did not pierce the card at all but only left an indentation, or punched the card
but did not dislodge the chad. Id. at 129.
196. Id. at 100. “Overvotes” can occur where the machine indicates more than one vote had been cast, as
would occur for a voter marking a candidate’s name, but then also writing in that candidate’s name on the writein line. Id. at 107–08.
197. Id. at 106–07.
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result, Bush’s lead over Gore in Florida was just 537 votes, with Bush having
198
received 2,912,790 votes and Gore 2,912,253.
Faced with these facts, seven Justices agreed that there were equal protection
199
problems with the recount ordered by the Florida Supreme Court. Five of these
seven Justices concluded there was no way factually for a constitutionally
200
adequate recount to be completed in time. In contrast, Justices Souter and
Breyer concluded that the majority should not presume that a constitutionally
201
adequate recount could not be completed in time.
It should be noted that the five Justices in the majority and the four Justices
202
in dissent disagreed on whether the Court should have taken the case at all. The
dissenting opinions suggested that the case was either a political question, or was
203
not yet ripe for resolution. As Justice Souter noted in one dissent,
If this Court had allowed the State to follow the course indicated by the
opinions of its own Supreme Court, it is entirely possible that there
would ultimately have been no issue requiring our review, and political
tension could have worked itself out in the Congress following the
204
procedure provided in 3 U.S.C. § 15.
Justice Breyer noted in another dissent,
[T]he Twelfth Amendment commits to Congress the authority and
responsibility to count electoral votes. . . . [T]here is no reason to believe
that federal law either foresees or requires resolution of such a political
issue by this Court. Nor, for that matter, is there any reason to think that
205
the Constitution’s Framers would have reached a different conclusion.

198. On these issues, see generally Lynne H. Rambo, The Lawyer’s Role in Selecting the President: A
Complete History of the 2000 Election, 8 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 105 (2002).
199. Bush, 531 U.S. at 111 (per curiam) (“Seven Justices of the Court agree that there are constitutional
problems with the recount ordered by the Florida Supreme Court.”); id. at 134 (Souter, J., joined by Breyer, J. in
Part III, dissenting) (“I can conceive of no legitimate state interest served by these differing treatments of the
expressions of voters’ fundamental rights.”). Justices Stevens and Ginsburg decided that these problems were
not serious enough to justify a finding of a violation of the equal protection clause. Id. at 143 (Ginsburg, J.,
joined by Stevens, J., in Part II, dissenting).
200. Id. at 110 (“[I]t is obvious that the recount cannot be conducted in compliance with the
requirements of equal protection and due process without substantial additional work.”).
201. Id. at 135 (Souter, J., joined by Breyer, J. in Part III, dissenting) (“Unlike the majority, I see no
warrant for this Court to assume that Florida could not possibly comply . . . before the date set for the meeting
of electors, December 18.”).
202. Id. at 129.
203. Id. at 129; id. at 154–55 (Breyer, J., joined by Stevens & Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting).
204. Id. at 129 (Souter, J., joined by Stevens, Ginsburg, & Breyer, JJ., dissenting).
205. Id. at 154–55 (Breyer, J., joined by Stevens & Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting).
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The majority per curiam opinion in Bush v. Gore did not directly address the
206
issues of ripeness and political question. Justice Scalia did address, indirectly,
the ripeness argument in his concurrence to the emergency stay order, which also
207
served as a grant of a petition for certiorari in the case. He concluded that
“irreparable harm” would result to “petitioner Bush, and to the country, by
208
casting a cloud upon what he claims to be the legitimacy of his election.” One
can ask, however, whether it was ripe to conclude there would be a “cloud” on
the “legitimacy” of the election if Congress were simply allowed to follow the
constitutionally proscribed procedures for counting electoral votes without prior
court intervention. In fact, based upon a later media-backed recount of the votes
in Florida, it appears that Bush would have remained ahead even if the Florida
209
recount had proceeded. At that point, Al Gore would have conceded the
election, and there would have been no need for a Court decision. The five
conservative Justices were uncertain that Bush would win the election, and may
have wished to decide the case and ensure he did.
Regarding the political question issue, it can be noted that there are judicially
manageable standards under the Equal Protection Clause to govern resolution of
this dispute and require uniformity in counting votes, using the Baker v. Carr
210
factors to determine if an issue is a political question. In contrast, while the
Court routinely resolves election disputes in the context of equal protection
violations, the issue regarding electors is unique because the Constitution
211
explicitly commits to Congress the responsibility of counting electoral votes
and commits to state legislatures exclusive power to create methods for selecting
212
electors. Thus, under these provisions, there are “textually demonstrable
constitutional commitments” to “coordinate political departments,” and it could
213
reasonably be regarded as a political question under Baker v. Carr.
Election challenges found little success in the wake of Bush v. Gore. Bush v.
214
Gore was decided under rational basis review. Seven of the nine Justices held
the recount authorized by the Florida Supreme Court unconstitutional under

206. Id.
207. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 1046, 1047 (2000) (Emergency Stay Order) (Scalia, J., concurring).
208. Id.
209. See Rambo, supra note 198, at 325–26 n.1479.
210. See 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
211. U.S. CONST. amend. XII.
212. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2; see generally Bush v. Palm Beach Cnty. Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S.
70, 76–78 (2000) (“[I]n such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct” means that this exclusive legislative
power cannot be circumscribed by the Florida Constitution.); cf. Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224 (1993)
(“[S]ole” power of Senate to try impeachments means Senate decisions regarding impeachment are political
questions not subject to Court review.).
213. For discussion of both the ripeness and political question issues as applied to Bush v. Gore, see
generally Erwin Chemerinsky, Bush v. Gore Was Not Justiciable, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1093 (2001).
214. 531 U.S. 98, 105–06 (2000).
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rational basis review, because it was so flawed in design that it was irrational in
216
terms of an attempt to count votes equally. Most other election inequalities,
however, such as optical scan machines in some counties of a state (more reliable
217
218
but more costly), but punch cards in others (more prone to error but cheaper),
or differences in the amount of voting booths provided (so that in poor areas the
lines typically are longer because not as many machines are provided), may be
unfair, but are not likely to be viewed as irrational under a rational basis test.
This is so particularly because considerations of administrative costs constitute a
legitimate government interest under rational basis scrutiny to justify such
disparities. For this reason, Bush v. Gore has not been viewed as very relevant in
219
other election cases. Recent election cases have typically involved electronic
220
voting equipment such as digital recording electronic devices (DREs). The
main concern here is security of the machines from hackers and accurate
221
electronic counting of the votes.
C. District of Columbia v. Heller
In District of Columbia v. Heller, the Court held 5–4 that the Second
Amendment protects an individual’s right to keep and bear arms, and that the
District of Columbia’s prohibition on possessing usable handguns in the home
222
violated that right. In Justice Scalia’s opinion, joined by Chief Justice Roberts
and Justices Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, Justice Scalia acknowledged a
principal purpose of the Second Amendment was to ensure that citizens had a
right to own guns in order to participate in organized state militias, a purpose not
223
relevant to participation in state militias today. However, while Justice Scalia
noted that the Framers’ focus in the Second Amendment may have been the
participation in militias, they also contemplated that individuals would use guns
224
for self-protection. That right to own guns for self-protection still applied

215. The design was flawed because of different ways to count punch-card ballots in different counties
and only counting undervotes, not overvotes. Id. at 106.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 147 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
218. Id.
219. See generally Richard B. Saphire & Paul Moke, Litigating Bush v. Gore in the States: Dual Voting
Systems and the Fourteenth Amendment, 51 VILL. L. REV. 229 (2006).
220. See generally Daniel P. Tokaji, The Paperless Chase: Electronic Voting and Democratic Values,
73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1711 (2005).
221. Id. Given these problems, states are increasingly requiring a voter-verified paper trail for counties
using DRE devices. See, e.g., CAL. ELEC. CODE § 19250 (West 2005); NEV. REV. STAT. § 293B.084 (2005);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3506.18 (West 2005).
222. 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008).
223. Id. at 599.
224. Id. at 595–600.
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today. Justice Scalia stated that the Court’s opinion should not cast doubt on
longstanding laws such as those prohibiting felons or the mentally ill from
possessing firearms; forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such
as schools and government buildings; or imposing conditions and qualifications
226
on the commercial sale of arms. Justice Scalia also noted that the right only
extends to the “sorts of weapons” that were “in common use” at the time the
227
Second Amendment was adopted. Thus, the right does not protect “dangerous
228
and unusual weapons.”
Justice Stevens, dissenting with Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, said
that the text of the Second Amendment, the history of its adoption, and United
States v. Miller, all indicate that the Amendment protects the right to keep and
bear arms for military purposes, but does not limit the legislature’s power to
229
regulate the nonmilitary use and ownership of arms. The Court’s precedents,
and the legislative history surrounding the adoption of the Second Amendment,
230
support this view. Normally, Justice Kennedy would have relied on such
231
sources and joined Justice Stevens’ opinion. In this case, however, Justice
Kennedy joined the conservative Justices to uphold an individual’s right to own
232
guns under the Second Amendment.
Heller will surely lead to legislative reexamination of gun-control laws and
lawsuits challenging existing bans. The decision in District of Columbia v. Heller
may have limited impact, however, except for rendering unconstitutional very
intrusive regulations regarding owning handguns or rifles. Only a few cities have
ordinances similar to the District of Columbia, and it is unclear how many those
statutes are enforced in practice. Since Heller, the Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals has held in United States v. Fincher that machine guns and sawed-off
shotguns were not covered by Heller because they are “dangerous and unusual
233
weapons.” The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, in Nordyke v. King, held that a
county ordinance barring guns on county property survived a Second

225. See id.
226. Id. at 626–28.
227. Id. at 627.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 636–40 (Stevens, J., joined by Souter, Ginsburg & Breyer, JJ., dissenting). Reflecting a
similar 5–4 split, the Court held in McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010), that the Second
Amendment is incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 3088 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 3120
(Breyer, J., joined by Ginsburg & Sotomayor, JJ., dissenting).
230. See, e.g., Heller, 554 U.S. at 637. “The text of the Amendment, its history, and our decision in
United States v. Miller . . . provide a clear answer to that question.” Id. (citation omitted).
231. On Justice Kennedy’s approach to interpretation, see Gregory E. Maggs, Justice Kennedy’s Use of
Sources of the Original Meaning of the Constitution, 44 MCGEORGE L. REV. 77 (2013).
232. Heller, 554 U.S. at 572 (stating that Justice Kennedy joined the opinion of the Court).
233. 538 F.3d 868, 886 (8th Cir. 2008).
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Amendment challenge by gun show organizers seeking to set up a booth at local
234
fairgrounds.
D. Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission
In Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, the Court considered the
constitutionality of 2 U.S.C. § 441b, prohibiting corporations from making
independent expenditures that referred to a clearly identified candidate within
thirty days of a primary election or within sixty days of a general election for
235
public office. The Government advanced three interests which it said were
compelling: distorting effects of large aggregations of wealth, an anti-corruption
236
interest, and a shareholder protection interest. In his opinion for a 5–4 Court,
237
Justice Kennedy rejected each one. He said that First Amendment protection
does not depend on the speaker’s financial ability to engage in public
238
discourse; independent expenditures do not give rise to corruption or the
239
appearance of corruption; and if the shareholder protection theory were
adopted, it would give the Government power to restrict the political speech of
media corporations and, furthermore, there is little evidence of abuse that cannot
240
be protected by shareholders through the processes of corporation democracy.
Justice Kennedy stated the Court did not reach the question of whether the
government has a compelling interest in preventing foreign corporations from
241
influencing our nation’s political process. In striking down 2 U.S.C. § 441b,
Justice Kennedy overruled Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce and part of
242
McConnell v. Federal Election Commission. The statute also included a
243
disclaimer requirement indicating who is responsible for the content of any
244
advertisement, and a disclosure requirement for any person spending more than

234. 664 F.3d 776, 788 (9th Cir. 2011) (“In any event, the Ordinance does not prohibit gun shows, but
merely declines to host them on government premises. The Proposed Second Amended Complaint, therefore,
does not allege sufficient facts to state a Second Amendment claim capable of surviving a motion to dismiss.”).
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has held, however, that bans on all firing ranges within Chicago likely
violates the Second Amendment. Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684 (7th Cir. 2011).
235. 130 S. Ct. 876, 886 (2010).
236. Id. at 903.
237. Id. at 904–08.
238. Id. at 904.
239. Id. at 908.
240. Id. at 910.
241. Id. at 903–11.
242. Id. at 911–13 (overruling Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990), and
part of McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93 (2003)); see also United States v. Danielczyk, 791 F.
Supp. 2d 512 (E.D. Va. 2011) (holding unconstitutional a ban on direct corporate contributions to federal
campaigns, imposed since 1907, under Citizens United).
243. 2 U.S.C. § 441d (2006).
244. Id. § 441f.
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245

$10,000 on electioneering communications within a calendar year. Justice
Kennedy found no constitutional impediment to applying those requirements to a
movie broadcast via video-on-demand, as there had been no showing that these
246
requirements would chill speech or expression.
Justice Kennedy has consistently adopted the conservative free speech
position in campaign finance cases. For example, in Davis v. Federal Election
Commission, a 5–4 Court invalidated a “Millionaire’s Amendment” to campaign
247
financing laws. The “Millionaire’s Amendment” allowed a candidate to receive
treble the normal limit on individual contributions and unlimited party
expenditures if the other candidate is regarded as self-financing because of
248
spending more than $350,000 of personal funds. Since that provision was
invalidated, so also were special disclosure requirements that were to be used in
249
calculating self-financing expenditures.
Justice Stevens, dissenting with
Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, said the Amendment does not deprive the
millionaire of any speech; it merely assisted the opponent of a self-financed
250
candidate to make his voice heard.
In Arizona Free Enterprise Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, a 5–4
Court ruled unconstitutional a law allowing candidates for state office who
accept public financing to receive roughly one dollar for every dollar spent by an
251
opposing, privately financed candidate, once a set spending limit is reached.
The Court held that there was no compelling interest to equalize electoral
252
253
funding. As in Davis, the four more liberal Justices dissented.

245. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 914.
246. Id. at 913–14, 917. Justice Thomas joined all but the final part of Justice Kennedy’s opinion, where
the Court upheld the disclaimer and disclosure requirements. Id. at 916. Justice Thomas pointed to a number of
examples wherein persons whose names and addresses were disclosed, as required by law, were subjected to
attacks and were left subject to retaliation from elected officials. Id. at 980–82 (Thomas, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part). He said that persons should have a right to anonymous speech. Id. Four other Justices
dissented in the case. Id. at 929 (Stevens, J., joined by Ginsburg, Breyer & Sotomayor, JJ., dissenting). In his
dissent, Justice Stevens concluded that there was plenty of evidence supporting the reasonableness of
Congress’s concern to deal with corruption, distortion, and shareholder protection. Justice Stevens said the fact
that corporations have no consciences, no beliefs, no feelings, and no thoughts or desires is a reminder that they
themselves are not “We the People” by whom and for whom our Constitution was established. Id. at 960–79.
He concluded that the majority view is contrary to the long recognition by the people of the need to prevent
corporations from undermining self-government. Id. at 948–60. These four Justices did agree with Justice
Kennedy that the disclaimer and disclosure requirements were constitutional. Id. at 979.
247. 554 U.S. 724, 744–45 (2008).
248. Id. at 729.
249. Id. at 740–44.
250. Id. at 749–57 (Stevens, J., joined by Souter, Ginsburg & Breyer, JJ., dissenting)
251. 131 S. Ct. 2806, 2812–13 (2011).
252. Id. at 2828.
253. Id. at 2829 (Kagan, J., joined by Ginsburg, Breyer & Sotomayor, JJ., dissenting) (compelling
interest to counteract corruption of large campaign contributions).
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Justice Kennedy joined the four conservative Justices in Federal Election
254
Commission v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc. Chief Justice Roberts and Justice
Alito acknowledged that McConnell upheld a ban on “express advocacy” by
corporations within sixty days of a general election, or thirty days of a primary
election, because there is a compelling interest in regulating “express advocacy”
by corporations whose economic power could otherwise distort the election
255
process. The Justices, however, held that McConnel did not control because the
ads at issue in Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc. were more properly viewed as “issue
256
ads” rather than “express advocacy” for a candidate. In adopting a test to
distinguish “express advocacy” from “issue advocacy,” Chief Justice Roberts
adopted a test by which most ads would be “issue ads,” since the “test affords
protection unless an ad is susceptible of no reasonable interpretation other than
as an appeal to vote for or against a specific candidate” and any “tie is resolved in
257
favor of protecting speech.” Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas adhered to
their view that McConnell was wrongly decided, and even “express advocacy”
258
should be permitted by corporations throughout the election cycle. Given Chief
259
Justice Roberts’ test, most ads will be viewed as “issue ads” anyway.
Continued skepticism toward campaign finance laws appears in lower federal
260
court cases.
E. Possible Future Cases
1. Healthcare
Under current Commerce Clause doctrine, the power of Congress to pass the
individual mandate under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act
(Obamacare) should be clear. Under modern doctrine, two issues must be
addressed: (1) does the regulation deal with commerce; and, if so, (2) does the

254. 551 U.S. 449 (2007).
255. Id. at 455–57.
256. Id. at 456–57.
257. Id. at 474–82 & n.7 (Roberts, C.J., announcing judgment of the Court, joined by Alito, J., with
respect to Parts III and IV).
258. Id. at 483–84 (Scalia, J., joined by Kennedy & Thomas, JJ., concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment).
259. Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer would have upheld the regulations on the ground
that the same compelling interest concerned with distortion of the election process by corporations with
economic power applies to both “express advocacy” ads and most “issue ads.” Id. at 504–08 (Souter, J., joined
by Stevens, Ginsburg & Breyer, JJ., dissenting).
260. See Long Beach Area Chamber of Commerce v. City of Long Beach, 603 F.3d 684 (9th Cir. 2010)
(municipal cap on acceptance of contributions by any “person” that makes independent expenditures supporting
or opposing a candidate unconstitutional); Dallman v. Ritter, 225 P.3d 610 (Colo. 2010) (voter-approved
amendment to the Colorado Constitution that prohibited political contributions from holders of no-bid contracts
with state entities unconstitutional).
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regulation deal with commerce among the states. Under United States v. Lopez, a
5–4 decision by the conservative Justices, including Justice Kennedy, there are
three ways to find such commerce among the states: (1) use of the channels of
interstate commerce and protecting the instrumentalities of interstate commerce
261
(Caminetti); (2) non-interstate activities if they threaten the instrumentalities of
interstate commerce, or persons or things in interstate commerce (The Shreveport
262
Rate Cases); or (3) commercial activities that have a substantial effect on
263
interstate commerce (Wickard).
Certainly, the medical insurance industry market is a commercial market that
has a substantial effect on interstate commerce under Wickard. Even if one
focuses solely on the individual mandate part of the Act, the cumulative
economic effect resulting from a person choosing not to buy insurance is
264
estimated at $1,000 a year. Additionally, even if the individual mandate is
viewed as mandating commerce, not regulating existing commerce, Congress
must have the ability to regulate both because, in the language of The Shreveport
Rate Cases, where
the government of the one [here, the interstate medical insurance market]
involves control of the other [here, regulating persons currently
uninsured], it is Congress, and not the state, that is entitled to prescribe
the final and dominant rule, for otherwise Congress would be denied the
exercise of its constitutional authority, and the state, and not the Nation,
265
would be supreme in the national field.
This has been true since Gibbons v. Ogden, where the Court held that to
permit Congress to have national solutions to national problems, Congress can
regulate whenever the commercial activity applies “to all the external concerns of
266
the nation, and to those internal concerns which affect the States generally.”
From the nation’s beginning, Congress has had the power to compel individuals
267
to purchase things to advance important public policy purposes. For example,
in the Second Militia Act of 1792, Congress required not only every able-bodied
white male between the age of eighteen to forty-five to register for service in a

261. Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470 (1917).
262. Hous. E. & W. Tex. Ry. Co. v. United States (The Shreveport Rate Cases), 234 U.S. 342, 351–52
(1914).
263. 514 U.S. 549, 558–59 (1995) (citing Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 121, (1942); Caminetti, 242
U.S. 470; The Shreveport Rate Cases, 234 U.S. at 351–52).
264. See Official Transcript of Oral Argument, Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. v. Florida 9, 14 (Mar.,
27, 2012), available at www.supremecourt.gov (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
265. The Shreveport Rate Cases, 234 U.S. at 351–52.
266. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 195 (1824).
267. See, e.g., Militia Act of 1792, ch. 33, I Stat. 271 (1792).
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State Militia, but also required each such individual to purchase a musket,
268
ammunition, shoulder-carrying case, and other implements to outfit himself.
For these reasons, the real issue in the Patient Protection and Affordable Care
269
Act should not be the power to regulate, but whether the individual mandate
270
provision violates Due Process. While requiring every person to “buy and
271
consume broccoli,” a concern of a district court in Florida, might violate due
process, as not being rationally related to a legitimate government interest,
requiring everyone to buy health insurance to avoid a problem of free-riders is
272
rational.
Even conservative Justices have acknowledged these Commerce Clause
principles in other recent cases. For example, in 2005 in Gonzales v. Raich, a 6–3
Court upheld application of the federal Controlled Substances Act (CSA) to
intrastate growers and users of marijuana for medical purposes, which were
273
allowed under provisions of California law. The majority opinion by Justice
Stevens, joined by Justices Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, reasoned, as
in Wickard v. Filburn, that Congress could find that failure to regulate this class
of activity could result, in the aggregate, in a substantial effect on the broad
274
market for illegal drugs that the CSA regulated. Congress acted rationally in
determining that none of the characteristics making up the purported class of
275
marijuana users compelled an exemption from CSA. Justice Scalia, concurring,
said that in addition to a power to regulate activities having a substantial effect on
interstate commerce, Congress has power under The Shreveport Rate Cases to
276
make its regulations of interstate commerce effective. Justice Scalia noted that
even Lopez suggested that “Congress may regulate even noneconomic local
activity if that regulation is a necessary part of a more general regulation of
277
interstate commerce.”

268. Id.
269. See Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama, 651 F.3d 529 (6th Cir. 2011) (holding the law is
constitutional).
270. See Florida ex rel. Bondi v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 780 F. Supp. 2d 1256, 1289
(N.D. Fla. 2011).
271. See id.
272. See Florida ex rel. Atty. Gen. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235 (11th Cir.
2011) (Marcus, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“Congress rationally found that the individual
mandate would address the powerful economic problems associated with cost shifting from the uninsured to the
insured and to health care providers . . . .”).
273. 545 U.S. 1, 33 (2005).
274. Id. at 32–33.
275. Id. at 14–33.
276. Id. at 38.
277. Id. at 33–42 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). In Gonzales v. Raich, Justice O’Connor was
joined in dissent by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas. Id. at 42. Justice O’Connor concluded that
“[t]he homegrown cultivation and personal possession and use of marijuana for medicinal purposes has no
apparent commercial character.” Id. at 50. She noted that even Wickard did not specifically approve of federal
control over small-scale, noncommercial wheat farming, since the federal law exempted the planting of less
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Similarly, the Court adopted a broad approach to federal legislative power in
278
United States v. Comstock. In Comstock, adopting a minimum rationality
review approach, the Court upheld 18 U.S.C. § 4248, which authorizes the
Department of Justice to detain a mentally ill, sexually dangerous federal
prisoner beyond the date the prisoner would otherwise be released, as long as the
original confinement was within Congress’s power, either authorized by express
constitutional text, such as for “counterfeiting” or “treason,” or a criminal law in
furtherance of some other power, such as mail fraud statutes as related to the post
279
office power. The Court also indicated that the same minimum rationality
review governs the Commerce Clause issue of whether Congress could rationally
280
think some activity has a substantial effect on interstate commerce.
Despite these decisions, Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia, Kennedy,
and Alito, indicated real concern at oral argument with whether the individual
mandate provision of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act was
281
constitutional. Justice Kennedy did acknowledge that he saw the connection
282
between persons not buying insurance and that effect on other individuals, but,
as it turned out, that was not enough for Justice Kennedy to vote to uphold the
283
Act in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius.
than six tons of wheat and, when the wheat was harvested, federal law exempted plantings of less than six acres.
Id. at 50–51. Even if the activity was commercial in some sense, Justice O’Connor concluded, “There is simply
no evidence that homegrown medicinal marijuana users constitute, in the aggregate, a sizable enough class to
have a discernable [sic], let alone substantial, impact on the national illicit drug market–or otherwise to threaten
the CSA regime.” Id. at 53 (O’Connor, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and Thomas, J., as to all but Part III,
dissenting).
278. 130 S. Ct. 1949 (2010).
279. Id. at 1957–65.
280. Id. at 1956–57. Concurring in the judgment, Justices Kennedy and Alito indicated their belief that
the Necessary and Proper Clause analysis, and the Commerce Clause analysis, may well require more
justification than a mere Equal Protection rational relationship test. Id. at 1966–68 (Kennedy, J., concurring in
the judgment); id. at 1968–69 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment). In dissent, Justice Thomas, joined by
Justice Scalia, was more forceful in rejecting the majority’s deferential Necessary and Proper Clause analysis.
Id. at 1975–77 (Thomas, J., joined by Scalia, J., in all but Part III.A.1.b, dissenting). However, the five-Justice
majority of Chief Justice Roberts and the four liberal instrumentalists, Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, Breyer, and
Sotomayor, adopted this view.
281. See Official Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 264, at 4–14, passim.
282. Id. at 104 (Kennedy, J., speaking) (“[T]he young person who is uninsured is uniquely proximately
very close to affecting the rates of insurance and the cost of providing medical care in a way that is not true in
other industries.”).
283. 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2643 (2012) (Kennedy, J. dissenting). Following the initial drafting of this Article,
the Supreme Court decided National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius. Id. In Sebelius, a fiveJustice majority voted to uphold the constitutionality of the individual mandate provision of the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act. Id. at 2578. Four Justices would have upheld the mandate under the
Commerce Clause, consistent with views expressed in this Article. Id. at 2609. In their view, the insurance
mandate was a regulation of commerce, since at some point in their lives every individual will need health care,
and thus individuals by being alive should be viewed as participating in the health care market. Id. (Ginsburg,
J., joined by Sotomayor, J., and joined as to Parts I, II, III, and IV by Breyer & Kagan, JJ., concurring in part,
concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part). In contrast, Chief Justice Roberts, in a view shared
by the other four Justices on the Court, including Justice Kennedy, concluded the mandate was not a
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2. Affirmative Action
In Grutter v. Bollinger, a 5–4 Court, per Justice O’Connor, concluded that
the University of Michigan’s law school system of individualized consideration
of applicants, taking race into account as a factor, satisfied strict scrutiny,
284
consistent with Justice Powell’s opinion in Bakke. On the other hand, with
Justice O’Connor switching sides, a 5–4 Court in Gratz v. Bollinger held
unconstitutional University of Michigan’s undergraduate system of giving the
same extra points to every member of a minority group without regard to how
285
much that individual had been the victim of prior discrimination. It was not the
least burdensome effective alternative available to ensure the undergraduate
program received the educational benefits flowing from a racially diverse student
286
body.
With the replacement of Justice O’Connor by Justice Alito in 2006, Justice
Kennedy will likely become the critical swing vote on race-based affirmative
287
action cases, including one the Court will hear this term. In his dissent in
Grutter, Justice Kennedy indicated less willingness to defer to government
decisions than Justice O’Connor, and a greater willingness to conclude that
programs in practice are adopting more burdensome kinds of quota systems,
288
rather than more permissible kinds of factor analyses. Justice Kennedy applied
a similar hard look to the race-based affirmation action programs in Parents
289
Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1. While
“regulation” of commerce, but rather “mandating” commerce, since it required individuals to purchase
insurance. Id. at 2586–93. Since the text of the Commerce Clause only gives Congress the power “to Regulate
Commerce,” these five Justices concluded that the mandate could not be authorized by the Commerce Clause.
Id. (Roberts, C.J., announced the judgment of the Court, and delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to
Parts I, II, and III-C); id. at 2642–43 (joint opinion of Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas & Alito, JJ., dissenting).
However, Chief Justice Roberts then adopted the judicial restraint maxim that when there are two possible
interpretations, the court should interpret the statute in a way that is constitutional. Id. at 2592 (citing Parsons v.
Bedford, 7 L. Ed. 732 (1830); Blodgett v. Holden, 274 U.S. 142, 148 (1927) (concurring opinion)). Applying
that maxim, Chief Justice Roberts concluded that the mandate could be viewed as a tax on individuals who do
not have health insurance, since “functionally” the provision operates as a tax, is collected by the Internal
Revenue Service, and the amount of the payment varies depending on a person’s income, just like a tax. Id. at
2593–96. Thus, the mandate was constitutional under Congress’s broad power to tax. Id. Thus, as with certain
of Justice Kennedy’s more conservative positions in the Establishment Clause area which have not been
adopted by a majority of the Court, see infra text accompanying notes 345–73, Justice Kennedy’s more
conservative position was not adopted here, and thus did not become law.
284. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 322–36 (2003).
285. 539 U.S. 244, 270–76 (2003); id. at 276–80 (O’Connor, J., concurring, joined by Breyer, J.,
concurring only in Justice O’Connor’s opinion and in the judgment).
286. Id. at 271–72.
287. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 644 F.3d 301 (5th Cir. 2011), rehearing en banc denied, 644 F.3d 301 (5th
Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 1536 (2012).
288. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 392–95 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
289. 551 U.S. 701 (2007) (a case consolidating the appeals in Parents Involved in Comm. Sch. v. Seattle
Sch. Dist. No. 1, 426 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 2005) and McFarland v. Jefferson Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 416 F.3d 513
(6th Cir. 2005)).
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acknowledging that diversity in a student body is a compelling interest, Justice
Kennedy concluded that the affirmative action programs in these cases either did
not clearly indicate whether they were using race: (1) as a factor, which would be
permissible under Grutter v. Bollinger; (2) as an absolute point preference, quota,
or set-aside, which would be impermissible under Gratz v. Bollinger; or (3) in a
clearly impermissible manner, with a blunt “white/non-white” classification
290
system.
The holding in Seattle School District No. 1 indicates the wisdom of moving
to socio-economic affirmative action. Socio-economic affirmative action will be
tested only by minimum rationality review, rather than the strict scrutiny given to
race-based affirmative action. Even Chief Justice Roberts’ four-Justice plurality
in Seattle School District No. 1 indicated a willingness to consider a broader
concept of socio-economic diversity based upon “‘many possible bases for
diversity admissions, [such as] admittees who have lived or traveled widely
abroad, are fluent in several languages, have overcome personal adversity and
family hardship, have exceptional records of extensive community service, and
291
have had successful careers in other fields.’” In a case this term involving use
of race as a factor in the University of Texas undergraduate admissions process,
Justice Kennedy may again apply a hard look and strike down the affirmative
292
action program.
IV. JUSTICE KENNEDY ON THE RELIGION CLAUSES
A. Establishment Clause Analysis
1. General Principles
Under the Establishment Clause, four different tests have been used to find
an “establishment of religion.” The four tests are: (1) the so-called Lemon Test,
which asks whether the government action has a sole purpose to advance
religion, or a principal or primary effect to advance religion, or creates an
293
excessive entanglement between church and state; (2) whether an objective

290. Id. at 783–85 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). Chief Justice
Roberts, joined by Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito, did not specifically conclude, as did Justice Kennedy,
that racial diversity in educational settings was a compelling interest. Id. at 725–32 (Roberts, C.J., joined by
Scalia, Thomas & Alito, JJ., as to Part III(B)); id. at 783–84 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). They avoided that issue by agreeing with Justice Kennedy that the programs here were not the least
restrictive effective alternatives under strict scrutiny review. Id. at 732–36 (Roberts, C.J., opinion for the Court,
joined by Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas & Alito, JJ.).
291. Id. at 722 (citing Grutter, 539 U.S. at 338).
292. See Fisher, 631 F.3d 213, rehearing en banc denied, 644 F.3d 301, cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 1536.
293. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612–13 (1971).
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294

observer would think the government action was an endorsement of religion;
295
(3) whether the government action is coercing or proselytizing religion; and (4)
whether the government action is an unreasonable accommodation of religion
296
given our Nation’s history and traditions.
The Lemon test is still supported by the liberal instrumentalist Justices, as the
precedents decided under the Lemon test reflect the liberal policy of a strong
297
separation of church and state. Justice O’Connor advocated replacing the
Lemon test with an “endorsement” test, which Justice Souter was willing to
298
follow. Justice Kennedy has focused more on the “coercion” or “proselytizing”
299
of religion. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Thomas have
wanted the analysis to focus on specific historical examples of accommodation
between church and state, both at the time of ratification and examples of our
300
nation’s history since that time. As conservative Justices, Chief Justice Roberts
and Justice Alito will likely take that approach.
In 1971, in Lemon v. Kurtzman, the Court analyzed Establishment Clause
doctrine in light of three concerns: (1) the law must have a secular legislative
purpose; (2) the law’s principal or primary effect must be one that neither
advances nor inhibits religion; and (3) the law must not foster an excessive
301
government entanglement with religion. The Lemon test, particularly as applied
by liberal instrumentalist Justices, has been used to support sensitivity to
religious diversity and the inclusion of all persons of different faiths or non302
believers as equal citizens in American society. More broadly, the Lemon test
supports a pluralistic democracy by serving as
a prophylactic measure that (1) protects religious liberty and autonomy,
including the protection of taxpayers from being forced to support
religious ideologies to which they are opposed; (2) stands for equal
citizenship without regard to religion, . . . ; (3) protects against the
294. County of Allegheny v. Am. Civil Liberties Union Greater Pittsburgh Ch., 492 U.S. 573, 598–600
(1989).
295. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 591–94 (1992).
296. Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 683–88 (2005).
297. See infra text accompanying notes 301–20.
298. See infra text accompanying notes 340–43.
299. See infra text accompanying notes 327–39.
300. See, e.g., Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 692 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“I would prefer . . . [doctrine] that is
in accord with our Nation’s past and present practices, and that can be consistently applied–the central relevant
feature of which is that there is nothing unconstitutional in a State’s favoring religion generally, honoring God
through public prayer and acknowledgment, or, in a nonproselytizing manner, venerating the Ten
Commandments.”).
301. 403 U.S. 602, 612–13 (1971).
302. See generally Lisa Shaw Roy, The Establishment Clause and the Concept of Inclusion, 83 OR. L.
REV. 1 (2004). “[There is a] trend within a particular strand of the Supreme Court’s Establishment Clause
jurisprudence that has become increasingly concerned with the religious minority’s sense of inclusion in a given
religious message.” Id. (footnote omitted).
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destabilizing influence of having the polity divided along religious lines;
(4) promotes political community; (5) safeguards the autonomy of the
state to protect the public interest; (6) shelters churches from the
corrupting influences of the state; and (7) promotes religion in the private
303
sphere.
As the Court has applied the Lemon test, it has come under attack as not
reflecting, in practice, principled or predictable doctrine. For example, when
considering the issue of legislative “purpose,” the Court concluded in Engel v.
Vitale that beginning each public school day with a prayer had no secular
304
purpose. The Court noted, “It is neither sacrilegious nor antireligious to say that
each separate government in this country should stay out of the business of
writing or sanctioning official prayers and leave that purely religious function to
the people themselves and to those the people choose to look for religious
305
guidance.” Similarly, in Stone v. Graham, the Court held that a statute
requiring the posting of the Ten Commandments on the walls of every public306
school classroom had only a religious purpose. At issue in Edwards v.
Aguillard was the constitutionality of Louisiana’s Creationism Act forbidding the
teaching of the theory of evolution in public elementary and secondary schools
unless accompanied by instruction in the theory of the theory of “creation
307
science.” The Court found the Act unconstitutional despite Louisiana’s
argument they were merely supporting a diversity of viewpoints because “the
primary purpose of the Creationism Act is to endorse a particular religious
308
doctrine.”
On the other hand, the Court held in McGowan v. Maryland that a state law
requiring businesses to be closed on Sunday, while having “strongly religious
origin[s]” and thus accommodating religion, was nonetheless permissible
because it had a secular purpose of providing “a uniform day of rest for all
309
citizens.” In Gillette v. United States, the Court held that creating an exception
to draft laws for conscientious objectors did not violate the Establishment Clause
because the law was supported by the secular, pragmatic consideration of the
difficulty of converting “a sincere conscientious objector into an effective
310
fighting man.” In Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the University of
Virginia, the Court permitted a university to impose on students a fee to support a

303.
(2004).
304.
305.
306.
307.
308.
309.
310.

Steven H. Shiffrin, The Pluralistic Foundations of the Religion Clauses, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 9, 37
370 U.S. 421, 435 (1962).
Id.
449 U.S. 39, 41 (1980).
482 U.S. 578, 594 (1987).
Id.
366 U.S. 420, 433, 445 (1961).
401 U.S. 437, 452–53 (1971).
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diversity of viewpoints, including religious viewpoints, because excluding
religious viewpoints would be “hostile” to religion and would deny individuals
311
free-speech rights. In addition, in a number of cases involving the Free
Exercise Clause, the Court has held that states must accommodate the beliefs of
religious citizens by exempting them from generally applicable regulations and
312
that is not an unconstitutional legislative purpose. In some cases, public schools
used the concern of a possible violation of the Establishment Clause as a
justification for refusing to allow groups with a religious perspective to use
313
school facilities. However, since Justice Kennedy has joined the Court, that
justification has not been successfully invoked, because the Court has concluded
that denial of equal access to school facilities violated the free-speech rights of
314
such groups.
There are inconsistencies throughout the Court’s decisions regarding the
second “principal or primary effect” prong of Lemon. For example, the Court has
found a primary effect to advance religion in providing funds to repair “physical
315
facilities” at a private religious school, but only an incidental effect where
316
funds were provided to build “secular buildings” on a religious campus.
Additionally, the Court found a primary effect to advance religion by providing
317
loans of “instructional equipment and materials” to private schools, but only an

311. 515 U.S. 819, 842–46 (1995).
312. See, e.g., Thomas v. Review Bd., Ind. Emp’t Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 716–20 (1981) (stating
unemployment compensation benefits cannot be denied to claimant, who terminated his job because his
religious beliefs forbade participation in production of armaments); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 213–19
(1972) (finding it is unconstitutional to apply Wisconsin’s compulsory education law to Amish parents who
amply supported their claim that enforcement of the compulsory formal education requirement after the eighth
grade would gravely endanger the free exercise of their religious belief); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403–
09 (1963) (holding it unconstitutional to apply eligibility provisions of unemployment compensation statute to
deny benefits to a Seventh-Day Adventist, who had refused employment based on her religious beliefs).
313. See, e.g., Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962); Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S.
203 (1963).
314. For example, in 1993, in Lamb’s Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School District, 508 U.S.
384, 392–97 (1993), the Court held that a school district violated the First Amendment freedom of speech when
it excluded a bible club from presenting films in a public forum opened by the school. Id. The school had denied
access because the films’ discussion of family values was from a religious perspective. Id. For the Court, Justice
White wrote that allowing use of school facilities for bible study would not have been an establishment under
the three-part Lemon test or constitute government endorsement of religion. Id. Justice Kennedy, concurred in
the judgment, but indicated his disapproval of the endorsement test. Id. at 397 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment). Consistent with Lamb’s Chapel, the Court held in Good News Club v. Milford
Central School, 533 U.S. 98 (2001), that a public school violated the free speech rights of a religious club that
was excluded from meeting after hours on school premises. Id. Justice Thomas said that if a public agency has
opened a limited public forum, as was done here, its power to restrict speech is limited in two ways: it may not
discriminate against speech on the basis of viewpoint and its restriction must be reasonable in light of the
purpose served by the forum. Id. at 106–20. The exclusion here, as in Lamb’s Chapel, constituted viewpoint
discrimination. Id.
315. Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 774–80 (1977).
316. Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 678–89 (1971).
317. Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 248–51 (1977).
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incidental effect to provide “secular textbooks” to students. The Court also
found a primary effect to advance religion to provide tuition grants to parents of
319
children attending private schools, but only an incidental effect where tax
benefits for textbooks, tuition, and transportation were granted to parents for
children in public or private schools, despite the fact that parents of children in
private schools would get most of the benefit, since private tuition is the main
part of the expense, and ninety-six percent of children attending private schools
320
attended religious schools.
Regarding the third “excessive entanglement” prong of Lemon, an attempt to
police the risk that religious messages will be conveyed in a school program
321
funded by public funds has constituted excessive entanglement of religion. At
the same time, no excessive entanglement existed in annual state grants to private
colleges, including religiously affiliated institutions, although four Justices
dissenting would have found excessive entanglement from dependency on grant
322
money. Recordkeeping and disclosure requirements associated with routine
collection of sales taxes on sales of religious materials was held to create no
323
excessive entanglement, while recordkeeping and disclosure requirements on
charities soliciting funds in a city, where disclosure included names, salaries, and
criminal histories of solicitors, and reports of funds collected, was held to
324
constitute excessive entanglement when applied to religious organizations.
2. Coercion or Proselytizing in the School Context
In 1980, before Justice Kennedy joined the Supreme Court, the Court held in
Stone v. Graham that the display of a copy of the Ten Commandments on the
walls of public classrooms violated the Establishment Clause as its sole purpose
325
was to advance religion. The decision in Stone was per curiam and summarily
326
reached without full briefing and argument.

318. Bd. of Educators of Cent. Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 240–48 (1968).
319. Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 780–83.
320. Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 394–403 (1983).
321. Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 808 (2000).
322. Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 404–14 (1985) (finding entanglement); Roemer v. Bd. of Pub.
Works of Md., 426 U.S. 736, 761–67 (1976) (finding no entanglement); id. at 770–73 (Brennan, J., joined by
Marshall, J., dissenting); id. at 773–75 (Stewart, J., dissenting); id. at 775 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (finding
entanglement).
323. Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 808.
324. Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Bd. of Equalization, 493 U.S. 378, 392–97 (1990) (finding no
entanglement); Church of Scientology Flag Serv. Org., Inc. v. City of Clearwater, 2 F.3d 1514, 1534–42 (11th
Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 807 (1994) (finding entanglement).
325. 449 U.S. 39, 41, 43 (1980).
326. Id. at 40–43. Four Justices dissented in the case. Chief Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun
indicated they would grant certiorari and give the case plenary consideration. Id. at 43 (Burger, C.J., joined by
Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Stewart also dissented from the summary reversal, indicating his view that, so
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Once Justice Kennedy joined the Court in 1992, his vote controlled in Lee v.
327
Weisman. In Weisman, the 5–4 Court, per Justice Kennedy, held that a public
school could not offer an invocation or benediction in a graduation exercise
because this exerted a subtle coercive pressure on students to participate in, or
appear to participate in, a religious exercise, given the fact that presence at
328
graduation is, in a practical sense, obligatory. Justice Kennedy explained that a
“state-created orthodoxy puts at grave risk the freedom of belief and conscience
329
which are the sole assurance that religious faith is real, not imposed.”
Reflecting a pragmatic approach, Justice Kennedy indicated that literal legal
330
coercion was not required if in-fact coercive pressure existed.
For Justice Kennedy, the case was distinguishable from Marsh v. Chambers,
which upheld prayers at legislative sessions, because any influence is much less
331
in that setting. In legislative sessions, any benediction is directed to individuals
332
as part of discharging their public jobs. Those individuals already have well333
formed views. The benedictions were not part of a state-sponsored educational
program, as in Weisman, with the state coercing or proselytizing on behalf of
334
religion. This focus on “coercion” as the touchstone of Establishment Clause
analysis is consistent with an emphasis on legislative and executive practice,
which, during the first 150 years of the Nation’s history, was predominantly
concerned with: “(1) institutional mingling between government and religion, (2)
direct governmental support for a particular religion, (3) special privileges for a
particular religion, or (4) coercion of religious belief, including the punishing of
335
non-adherents.”
An indication of how close the issue of “coercion” is in Weisman is the fact
that, according to Justice Blackmun’s private court papers (made public in 2004),
Justice Kennedy initially voted in the case to uphold the graduation benediction
336
as not being coercive. Justice Kennedy was assigned to write that opinion for
far as appears, the lower courts applied correct constitutional criteria. Id. (Stewart, J., dissenting). Justice
Rehnquist filed a dissent, stating that the statute did have a secular purpose of acknowledging the role the Ten
Commandments has played in the social, cultural, and historical development of our Nation. Id. at 44–46
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
327. 505 U.S. 577, 590–99 (1992).
328. Id. at 586–99.
329. Id. at 592.
330. Id.
331. 463 U.S. 783, 792–95 (1983).
332. Id. at 783.
333. Id. at 821.
334. Weisman, 505 U.S. at 577.
335. Stuart Buck, The Nineteenth-Century Understanding of the Establishment Clause, 6 TEX. REV. L.
& POL. 399, 400 (2002); see also generally id. at 400–09; Michael W. McConnell, The Origins of the Religion
Clauses of the Constitution: Coercion: The Lost Element of Establishment, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 933, 939–
41 (1986).
336. Charles Lane, Blackmun’s Papers Shine Spotlight on Control of High Court, WASH. POST, Mar. 8,
2004, at A01.
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the conservative position, but in drafting the opinion he changed his mind,
eventually viewing the benediction as creating too much subtle coercive
337
pressure. Justice Kennedy thus switched his vote and wrote the opinion for
338
himself and the other more liberal Justices on the Court. Perhaps this partly
explains Justice Scalia’s bitter dissent, and his focus on why, in his view, there
339
was no unconstitutional coercion present in Weisman.
While Justice Kennedy was the critical fifth vote in Weisman, and thus his
adoption of the “coercion” test was determinative in that case, given the change
in Court membership since 1992, a five-Justice majority (Justices Stevens,
O’Connor, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer) analyzed Establishment Clause cases
from 1994–2005 from the more vigorous requirement of “neutrality,” which
340
prohibits government “endorsement” of religion. For example, in 2000, the
Court considered the constitutionality of a student prayer delivered before a
341
football game. In Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe, the Court held
6–3 that school involvement in the process of selecting the student speaker
342
invited and encouraged religious messages. Reflecting the endorsement theory,
the Court opinion noted, “Regardless of the listener’s support for, or objection to,
the message, an objective Santa Fe High School student will unquestionably
perceive the inevitable pregame prayer as stamped with her school’s seal of
343
approval.” The Court also noted that the prayer was “coercive” under Justice
344
Kennedy’s opinion in Lee v. Weisman.
3. Coercion or Proselytizing in Non-School Cases
In cases not involving children in school, Justice Kennedy has been less
willing to find coercion, and has often voted differently than results under the
endorsement approach. For example, in County of Allegheny v. American Civil
Liberties Union, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, a county displayed a crèche in the
county courthouse and a city displayed a menorah in front of the City-County

337. Id.
338. See, e.g., id.
339. 505 U.S. at 636–44 (Scalia, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and White & Thomas, JJ., dissenting).
340. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000).
341. Id.
342. Id. at 314–15.
343. Id. at 308.
344. Id. at 312. Chief Justice Rehnquist, dissenting with Justices Scalia and Thomas, said the majority
opinion “bristles with hostility to all things religious in public life.” Id. at 318 (Rehnquist, C.J., joined by Scalia
& Thomas, JJ., dissenting). The Court should not declare the policy invalid on its face because it has plausible
secular purposes—to solemnize the event, to promote good sportsmanship, and thereby also to promote student
safety. Id. at 320. The dissent noted that “‘[i]t has not been the Court’s practice, in considering facial challenges
to statutes . . . to strike them down in anticipation that particular applications may result in unconstitutional’”
behavior. Id. at 319 n.1 (citing Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 612 (1988)) (alterations in original).
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Building. The crèche had a banner that proclaimed, “Gloria in Excelsis Deo,”
346
and there were no figures of Santa Clause or other decorations. The menorah
was placed next to a forty-five-foot Christmas tree and a sign titled “Salute to
347
Liberty.” Beneath this title, the sign stated: “During this holiday season, the
city of Pittsburgh salutes liberty. Let these festive lights remind us that we are the
348
keepers of the flame of liberty and our legacy of freedom.” Justice Brennan,
joined by Justices Marshall and Stevens, would have held that both displays
349
violated the Establishment Clause. Justice Brennan stated, “I continue to
believe that the display of an object that ‘retains a specifically Christian [or
other] religious meaning,’ is incompatible with the separation of church and state
350
demanded by our Constitution.”
In contrast, Justices Blackmun and O’Connor drew distinctions between the
351
crèche display and the menorah/Christmas tree/sign (MCS) display. Both
viewed the crèche display as having the impermissible effect of endorsing
352
religion, while both viewed the MCS display as not constituting government
353
endorsement. Justice Blackmun explained his conclusion that the two displays
were different by noting that
the combination of the tree and the menorah communicates, not a
simultaneous endorsement of both the Christian and Jewish faiths, but
instead, a secular celebration of Christmas coupled with an
acknowledgment of Chanukah as a contemporaneous alternative
tradition. . . . The sign states that during the holiday season the city
354
salutes liberty.
Justice O’Connor explained her conclusion that the two displays were different
by noting that the crèche display conveys a message to non-adherents of
Christianity that they are “not full members of the political community,” and a
corresponding message to Christians that they are “favored members of the
355
political community.” However, the MCS display sent a message of pluralism

345.
346.
347.
348.
349.

492 U.S. 573, 579–82 (1989).
Id. at 580–81.
Id. at 581–82.
Id. at 582.
Id. at 649–50 (Brennan, J., joined by Marshall & Stevens, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in

part).
350. Id. at 637 (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 708 (1984) (Brennan, J., joined by Marshall,
Blackmun & Stevens, JJ., dissenting)) (alteration in original) (footnote omitted).
351. Id. at 581–85.
352. Id. at 598–602 (Blackmun, J., joined by Brennan, Marshall, Stevens & O’Connor, JJ.).
353. Id.
354. Id. at 616–21 (this part of Justice Blackmun’s opinion was joined by no other Justice on the Court).
355. Id. at 625 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
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and freedom to choose one’s own beliefs, and not a message of endorsement of
356
Judaism or of religion in general.
Justice Kennedy, with Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White and Scalia,
357
said that both displays were constitutional. Reflecting his coercion approach to
the Establishment Clause, Justice Kennedy noted that in his view, only two
limiting principles should exist on accommodating religion: (1) the “government
358
may not coerce anyone to support or participate in any religion or its exercise,”
and (2) “it may not, in the guise of avoiding hostility or callous indifference, give
direct benefits to religion in such a degree that it in fact ‘establishes a [state]
359
religion or religious faith, or tends to do so.’” Justice Kennedy also stated that
to find unconstitutional advancement of religion here reflects “an unjustified
hostility toward religion, a hostility inconsistent with our history and our
360
precedents.”
In 2005, in McCreary County, Kentucky v. American Civil Liberties Union of
Kentucky, a five-Justice majority of Justices Stevens, O’Connor, Souter,
Ginsburg, and Breyer held that posting a version of the Ten Commandments in a
361
courthouse was unconstitutional. Justice Souter’s majority opinion struck down
the display based on the first prong of Lemon, that its “primary purpose” was to
362
advance religion. Justice O’Connor, concurring, noted that the “primary
purpose” behind the county’s display was relevant because, under her
endorsement test, it conveyed “an unmistakable message of endorsement to the
363
reasonable observer.” Indeed, consistent with this view, in 1987 Justice
O’Connor had joined with Justice Powell, concurring in Edwards v. Aguillard,
noting that to violate the Establishment Clause the “religious purpose must
364
predominate.”
In Part I of his dissent, Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justice Thomas, would have upheld the display of the Ten Commandments based

356. Id. at 625–27, 632–37.
357. Id. at 576 (Kennedy, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and White & Scalia, JJ., concurring in the
judgment in part and dissenting in part).
358. Id. at 659.
359. Id. (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 678 (1984)) (alteration in original).
360. Id. at 655 (citations omitted).
361. 545 U.S. 844, 881 (2005).
362. Id. at 861–65; see also ACLU of Ohio Found., Inc. v. Ashbrook, 375 F.3d 484 (6th Cir. 2004)
(finding a judge’s display of a framed poster in his courtroom of the Ten Commandments, which he created
himself on his computer, unconstitutional, despite being displayed across from a similarly styled framed poster
of the Bill of Rights).
363. Id. at 883–84 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (citing Lynch, 465 U.S. at 690).
364. 482 U.S. 578, 599 (1987) (Powell, J., joined by O’Connor, J., concurring). In American Civil
Liberties Union of Kentucky v. McCreary County, Kentucky, 607 F.3d 439 (6th Cir. 2010), the preliminary
injunction against the display of the Ten Commandments which the Supreme Court affirmed in McCreary
County, Kentucky v. American Civil Liberties Union of Kentucky, 545 U.S. 844 (2005), was made permanent.
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on a “customs and traditions” approach. In Part II of his dissent, which was
also joined by Justice Kennedy, Justice Scalia criticized the majority for (1)
shifting the focus in Lemon from “actual” government purposes to how
government purposes would be “perceived” by an objective observer under an
“endorsement” inquiry; and (2) modifying Lemon to hold that “primary” or
“predominate” religious purposes, rather than “sole” religious purposes, can
366
violate the first prong of the Lemon test. In Part III of his dissent, Justice Scalia,
joined by Justice Kennedy, concluded that, even under the Lemon test, the
display was motivated not by a religious purpose, but by a non-coercive secular
acknowledgment of the role the Ten Commandments have played in our Nation’s
367
moral and legal history.
On the same day McCreary was decided, Justice Breyer voted in Van Orden
v. Perry with Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas,
to uphold a plaque of the Ten Commandments that was included among sixteen
368
other plaques on grounds in front of the Texas Capitol building. In this case,
Justice Breyer concluded:
In certain contexts, a display of the tablets of the Ten Commandments
can convey not simply a religious message but also a secular moral
message (about proper standards of social conduct). And in certain
contexts, a display of the tablets can also convey a historical message
(about a historic relation between those standards and the law) . . . . The
circumstances surrounding the display’s placement on the capitol
grounds and its physical setting suggest that the State itself intended the
latter, nonreligious aspects of the tablets’ message to predominate. And
the monument’s 40-year history on the Texas state grounds indicates that
369
has been its effect.
The other eight Justices on the Court decided McCreary and Van Orden the
370
same way. Justices Stevens, O’Connor, Souter, and Ginsburg concluded that
371
this plaque in Van Orden also constituted an endorsement of religion. Chief

365. McCreary County, 545 U.S. at 885–94 (Scalia, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and Thomas, J., and
joined in Parts II and III by Kennedy, J., dissenting).
366. Id. at 900–03.
367. Id. at 903–12.
368. 545 U.S. 677, 698 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment).
369. Id. at 701.
370. Id. at 677–79.
371. Id. at 738–39 (Souter, J., joined by Stevens & Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting) (“[A] pedestrian happening
upon the monument at issue here needs no training in religious doctrine to realize that the statement of the
Commandments, quoting God himself, proclaims that the will of the divine being is the source of obligation to
obey the rules, including the facially secular ones.”). Responding to an argument that the sixteen other plaques
reduced the religious message conveyed by the plaque, Justice Souter responded,
But 17 monuments with no common appearance, history, or esthetic role scattered over 22 acres is
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Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas found no coercion
or proselytizing in placing the plaque, and said that the plaque was consistent
372
with the Nation’s history and traditions. For them, whatever “may be the fate of
the Lemon test in the larger scheme of Establishment Clause jurisprudence, we
think it not useful in dealing with the sort of passive monument that Texas has
373
erected on its Capitol grounds.”
Cases involving the Ten Commandments continue to be litigated. Following
Van Orden, the Eighth Circuit held en banc in ACLU Nebraska Foundation v.
City of Plattsmouth that a granite monument in a city park displaying the Ten
374
Commandments did not violate the Establishment Clause. A dissenting opinion
noted that, unlike the display in Van Orden, the monument’s message here stood
375
alone with nothing to suggest a broader historical or secular context. The
dissent also noted that
the oft noted image of Moses holding two tablets, depicted on the frieze
in the Supreme Court’s courtroom, appears in the company of seventeen
other lawgivers, both religious and secular. Similarly, the depiction of
Moses and the Ten Commandments on the Court’s east pediment also
376
finds him in the company of renowned secular figures.
On the other hand, in Green v. Haskell County Board of Commissioners, the
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals held that placing a Ten Commandments
monument on a county courthouse lawn was an impermissible endorsement of
religion, particularly given statements by commissioners underscoring the
377
religious significance of the message. The county was also ordered to pay, over
378
ten years, $199,000 in attorneys’ fees to the prevailing party.

not [one display] . . . . One monument expresses admiration for pioneer women. One pays respect to
the fighters of World War II. And one quotes the God of Abraham whose command is the sanction
for moral law. . . . In like circumstances, we rejected an argument similar to the State’s, noting in
County of Allegheny that “[t]he presence of Santas or other Christmas decorations elsewhere in the
. . . [c]ourthouse . . . fail to negate the [crèche’s] endorsement effect . . . . [T]he crèche . . . was its
own display distinct from any other decorations . . . in the building.”
Id. at 742–43 (quoting County of Allegheny v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 492 U.S. 573, 598–99 (1989))
(alterations in original). Justice O’Connor also dissented in Van Orden. 545 U.S. at 737 (O’Connor, J.,
dissenting).
372. Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 677–78.
373. Id. at 688 (Rehnquist, C.J., joined by Scalia, Thomas & Kennedy, JJ., plurality opinion).
374. 419 F.3d 772, 774–77 (8th Cir. 2005) (en banc opinion) (citations omitted).
375. Id. at 778–81 (Bye, J., joined by M.S. Arnold, J., dissenting).
376. Id. at 780 (Bye, J., joined by M.S. Arnold, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
377. 568 F.3d 784, 788 (10th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 1687 (2010).
378. CNN Wire Staff, Oklahoma County Must Pay Up in Ten Commandments Case, CNN (July 28,
2010),
http://articles.cnn.com/2010-07-28/us/oklahoma.ten.commandments_1_aclu-granite-monument-court
house-lawn?_s=PM:US (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).

149

05_KELSO_VER_01_6-11-12_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

7/22/2013 2:33 PM

2013 / Jurisprudence on the First Amendment Religion Clauses
In 1934, in Salazar v. Buono, private citizens had placed a Latin cross on a
rock outcropping in a remote section of the Mojave Desert, owned by the federal
379
government, in order to honor American soldiers who died in World War I. In
2004, the federal government passed a statute to transfer the cross and the land
on which it stands to a private party, the Veterans of Foreign Wars, in order to
380
avoid a violation of the Establishment Clause. In Buono, a 5–4 Court remanded
the case to the district court to determine whether a “reasonable observer” would
381
view the transfer as the endorsement of religion. Justice Kennedy’s plurality
382
opinion strongly indicated the transfer should be viewed as constitutional. He
noted, “Here, one Latin cross in the desert evokes far more than religion. It
evokes thousands of small crosses in foreign fields marking the graves of
Americans who fell in battles, battles whose tragedies are compounded if the
383
fallen are forgotten.”
The accommodation permitted in Buono, of course, has its limits. For
example, in American Atheists, Inc. v. Duncan, the Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals held that a sequence of crosses erected on Utah highways to
memorialize fallen Utah Highway Patrol state troopers violated the
Establishment Clause, as they would convey to a reasonable observer the
384
message that the state prefers, or otherwise endorses, a certain religion.
4. Support for Religious Expression or Aid in Schools
For Justice Kennedy, other aspects of government support for private
religious schools do not pose the same kind of problem of proselytizing or
coercion as prayer, or benedictions at graduation, or posting of the Ten
Commandments in the school context. Even under the endorsement test, such
support is more likely to be held constitutional, although on narrower grounds.
For example, in 1997, in Agostini v. Felton, the Court overruled early cases
decided under the Lemon test which had limited the kind and amount of
385
government aid to private religious schools. In a case involving Title I funds,
used to provide remedial education, guidance, and job counseling to eligible
students, Justice O’Connor rejected the argument that Title I provides aid to
386
religion by creating incentives for persons to attend parochial schools. She
stated that no such incentive exists where the aid is allocated on the basis of
379. 130 S. Ct. 1803, 1807 (2010).
380. Id. at 1829.
381. Id. at 1821.
382. Id. at 1820.
383. Id.
384. 616 F.3d 1145, 1150 (10th Cir. 2010).
385. 521 U.S. 203, 208–18, 235–36 (1997), overruling Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985); Sch.
Dist. of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985).
386. Agostini, 521 U.S. at 223–31.
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neutral, secular criteria that neither favor nor disfavor religion, and where the aid
is made available to religious and secular beneficiaries on a nondiscriminatory
387
basis.
The weakening of the Lemon test in the school aid context continued in 2000
388
in Mitchell v. Helms. In a plurality opinion, Justice Thomas, joined by Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Kennedy, upheld a federal program
funding state agencies that loaned educational materials and equipment to public
and private schools, with the enrollment of each participating school determining
389
the amount of aid. Justice Thomas noted that in Agostini, the Court had
modified the Lemon test for the purpose of evaluating aid to schools by stating
that entanglement is not a separate inquiry, but only one criterion for deciding if
there is a primary effect of advancing religion, and by revising criteria for
390
determining the principal or primary effect of a statute. After Agostini, Justice
Thomas said three primary criteria are used to evaluate whether government aid
has the effect of impermissibly advancing religion: does the aid “result in
governmental indoctrination; define its recipients by reference to religion; or
391
create an excessive entanglement.” Justice Thomas also noted that government
neutrality, rather than indoctrination, is virtually assured if an aid program
literally, or figuratively, passes through the hands of numerous private citizens
392
who can direct the aid elsewhere by choosing a school for their children. In
393
such a case, the private citizen is making the choice, not the government.
Justice O’Connor, joined by Justice Breyer, concurred in the judgment, but
said the plurality was relying too heavily on formal neutrality and the plurality’s
394
discussion of direct versus indirect aid and of diversion was flawed. For Justice
O’Connor, the three Agostini criteria are “factors” to be weighed against an
overall decision of whether a reasonable observer would conclude that the
395
government’s action constituted an “endorsement” of religion. From that
perspective, as Justice O’Connor noted:
[A] government program of direct aid to religious schools based on the
number of students attending each school differs meaningfully from the
government distributing aid directly to individual students who, in turn,

387. Id. at 228–32. Four more liberal Justices dissented in Agostini. Id. at 241–47 (Souter, J., joined by
Stevens & Ginsburg, JJ., and which Breyer, J., joined in part, dissenting).
388. 530 U.S. 793, 807–08 (2000) (Thomas, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and Scalia & Kennedy, JJ.,
plurality opinion).
389. Id. at 801–02, 836.
390. Id. at 808–09.
391. Id. at 808 (citing Agostini, 521 U.S. at 234).
392. Id. at 816.
393. Id. at 809–14, 820–25.
394. Id. at 837 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
395. Id. at 843–44.

151

05_KELSO_VER_01_6-11-12_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

7/22/2013 2:33 PM

2013 / Jurisprudence on the First Amendment Religion Clauses
decide to use the aid at the same religious schools. In the former
example, if the religious school uses the aid to inculcate religion in its
students, it is reasonable to say that the government has communicated a
message of endorsement. . . . In contrast, when government aid supports
a school’s religious mission only because of independent decisions made
by numerous individuals to guide their secular aid to that school, “[n]o
reasonable observer is likely to draw from the facts . . . an inference that
396
the State itself is endorsing a religious practice or belief.”
The more accommodating approach toward school aid issues adopted in
397
Mitchell continued in 2002 in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris. Zelman involved a
pilot program adopted by the state of Ohio in 1996 to provide educational
choices to families with children who reside in a “covered district,” defined to
398
apply only to Cleveland. Under the program, the state provided tuition aid of up
to $2,250 per year to parents who chose to send their child to a school other than
399
a Cleveland public school.
Any private school, whether religious or
nonreligious, could participate in the program and accept program students so
long as the school was located within the boundaries of a covered district and met
400
statewide educational standards. Participating private schools had to agree not
to discriminate on the basis of race, religion, or ethnic background, or to
“advocate or foster unlawful behavior or teach hatred of any person or group on
401
the basis of race, ethnicity, national origin, or religion.” Any public school
located in a school district adjacent to the covered district could also participate
402
in the program. Adjacent public schools were eligible to receive the same

396. Id. at 842–43 (O’Connor, J., joined by Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment), (citing Lynch v.
Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 692 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring)) (discussing “endorsement”). Justice Souter,
dissenting with Justices Stevens and Ginsburg, agreed with Justice O’Connor that the Agostini criteria are
factors to be weighed in an overall balance concerning the principal or primary effect of any aid program. Id. at
868, 889–99 (Souter, J., joined by Stevens & Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting). In engaging in this factor analysis,
Justice Souter noted that the Court’s precedents under Lemon has considered “whether the government is acting
neutrally in distributing its money, and about the form of the aid itself, its path from government to religious
institution, its divertibility to religious nurture, its potential for reducing traditional expenditures of religious
institutions, and its relative importance to the recipient, among other things.” Id. at 868–69. In addition,
reflecting concerns with entanglement between church and state, Justice Souter noted that the Court’s
precedents had expressed concern with whether state aid would “violate a taxpayer’s liberty of conscience,
threaten to corrupt religion, [or] generate disputes over aid.” Id. at 901. In this case, Justice Souter said, the
plurality was rejecting the fundamental principle that had emerged from applying these factors in earlier cases
of no taxpayer funded aid to a school’s religious mission. Id. at 912. Here there was aid to the schools
themselves which could be used, and was being used, to advance the religious inculcative functions of the
recipient religious schools. Id. at 868–69, 885, 901, 908–13.
397. 536 U.S. 639, 643–48 (2002).
398. Id. at 643–44.
399. Id. at 645.
400. Id. at 647.
401. Id. at 645 (quoting OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3313.976(A)(6)).
402. Id.
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$2,250 tuition grant for each program student accepted, in addition to the full
amount of per-pupil state funding attributable to each additional student,
403
although none of the public schools chose to participate in the program.
Given these details, the governmental aid program was neutral on its face
with respect to religion, providing voucher assistance for educational expenses to
a broad class of citizens, who made independent judgments whether to use the
404
voucher to fund educational expenses at religious or secular private schools.
For the Mitchell majority, including Justice Kennedy, this made the program
405
clearly constitutional. Justice Thomas also noted in a separate concurrence that
the main beneficiaries of this program would be low-income minorities living in
Cleveland who wished for educational alternatives to the Cleveland public
schools, which were “[b]esieged by escalating financial problems and declining
406
academic achievement.”
Concurring as the critical fifth vote, Justice O’Connor emphasized the
limited nature of the program: it did not provide “substantial” aid to the religious
schools; the nonpublic schools, both religious and secular, had to accept students
without regard to “race, religion, or ethnic background”; and the parents had a
407
range of non-religious private schools from which to choose. Thus, the program
could not be viewed by a reasonable observer as government endorsement of
408
409
religion. Lower court opinions after Zelman have followed this approach.

403. Id. at 643–48.
404. Id. at 662–63.
405. Id. at 652–54.
406. Id. at 676–77 (Thomas, J., concurring).
407. Id. at 663 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
408. Id. at 668–76. In his dissent, Justice Souter, joined by Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer, noted
that under this voucher program up to $2,250 in tuition vouchers could be used by parents sending their children
to religious schools. Id. at 687 (Souter, J., joined by Stevens, Ginsburg & Breyer, JJ., dissenting). He noted,
The money will thus pay for eligible students’ instruction not only in secular subjects but in religion
as well, in schools that can fairly be characterized as founded to teach religious doctrine and to
imbue teaching in all subjects with a religious dimension. Public tax money will pay at a systemic
level for teaching the covenant with Israel and Mosaic law in Jewish schools, the primacy of the
Apostle Peter and the Papacy in Catholic schools, the truth of reformed Christianity in Protestant
schools, and the revelation to the Prophet in Muslim schools, to speak only of major religious
groupings in the Republic.
Id. Under the instrumentalist-era precedents of Allen, Tilton, and Nyquist, among others, this aid to religious
schools, not limited to secular materials, secular instruction, or secular construction, would have been held to
violate the Establishment Clause, as Justice Souter noted. Id. at 686–93.
409. See Am. Jewish Congress v. Corp. for Nat’l & Cmty. Serv., 399 F.3d 351, 354–59 (D.C. Cir. 2005)
(stating federally chartered corporation’s AmeriCorps Education Awards Program, a nationwide community
service program which allowed participants to be placed as teachers in both secular and religious schools, did
not violate Establishment Clause, even though some participating individuals at religious schools elected to
teach religion in addition to secular subjects; participants were chosen without regard to religion, participants’
choice to teach religion in addition to secular subjects did not have imprimatur of government endorsement, and
participants who chose to teach in religious schools did so only as a result of their own private choice).
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Regarding religious influences in the public schools, it is relatively
uncontroversial that public schools can teach about religion and religious
410
influences on society and historical events. Indeed, in 1963 in School District
of Abington Township v. Schempp, the Court acknowledged that reading passages
from religious works, such as the Bible, the Torah, or the Koran, was permissible
when presented objectively as part of a secular program of education, as they are
411
worthy of study for their literary and historic qualities. For Justice O’Connor,
as well as Justice Kennedy, these cases do not raise difficult issues. As she stated,
concurring in Elk Grove School District v. Newdow, “It is unsurprising that a
Nation founded by religious refugees and dedicated to religious freedom should
412
find references to divinity in its symbols, songs, mottoes, and oaths.”
Note, for example, the following state mottoes: Arizona (“God Enriches”);
Colorado (“Nothing without the Deity”); Connecticut (“He Who Is Transplanted
Still Sustains”); Florida (“In God We Trust”); Ohio (“With God All Things Are
413
Possible”); and South Dakota (“Under God the People Rule”). Arizona,
Colorado, and Florida have placed their mottoes on their state seals, and the
mottoes of Connecticut and South Dakota appear on the flags of those states as
414
well. Georgia’s newly redesigned flag includes the motto, “In God We
415
Trust.” Many of our patriotic songs contain overt or implicit references to the
divine, among them: “America” (“Protect us by thy might, great God our

410. See generally Kent Greenawalt, Teaching About Religion in the Public Schools, 18 J.L. & POL. 329
(2002).
411. 374 U.S. 203, 223–27 (1963).
412. 542 U.S. 1, 35–36 (2004) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
413. Arizona State Motto, STATE SYMBOLS USA, http://www.statesymbolsusa.org/Arizona/motto_
arizona.html (last visited Oct. 7, 2012) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review); Colorado State Motto, STATE
SYMBOLS USA, http://www.statesymbolsusa.org/Colorado/state_motto.html (last visited Oct. 7, 2012) (on file
with the McGeorge Law Review); Connecticut State Motto, STATE SYMBOLS USA, http://www.statesymbols
usa.org/Connecticut/mottoConnecticut.html (last visited Oct. 7, 2012) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review);
Florida Symbols—Emblems—Icons, STATE SYMBOLS USA, http://www.statesymbolsusa.org/Florida/StateSymbols-Florida.html (last visited Oct. 7, 2012) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review); Ohio State Motto,
STATE SYMBOLS USA, http://www.statesymbolsusa.org/Ohio/Ohio-state-motto.html (last visited Oct. 7, 2012)
(on file with the McGeorge Law Review); South Dakota Symbols—Emblems—Icons, STATE SYMBOLS USA,
http://www.statesymbolsusa.org/South_Dakota/StateSymbolsSDakota.html (last visited Oct. 7, 2012) (on file
with the McGeorge Law Review).
414. Arizona State Seal, STATE SYMBOLS USA, http://www.statesymbolsusa.org/Arizona/seal.html (last
visited Oct. 7, 2012) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review); Colorado State Seal, STATE SYMBOLS USA,
http://www.statesymbolsusa.org/Colorado/seal_colorado.html (last visited Oct. 7, 2012) (on file with the
McGeorge Law Review); Floria State Seal, STATE SYMBOLS USA, http://www.statesymbolsusa.org/Florida/
seal_florida.html (last visited Oct. 7, 2012) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review); Connecticut State Flag,
STATE SYMBOLS USA, http://www.statesymbolsusa.org/Connecticut/flag_CT.html (last visited Oct. 7, 2012)
(on file with the McGeorge Law Review); South Dakota State Flag, STATE SYMBOLS USA,
http://www.statesymbolsusa.org/South_Dakota/state_FLAG.html (last visited Oct. 7, 2012) (on file with the
McGeorge Law Review).
415. Georgia State Flag, STATE SYMBOLS USA, http://www.statesymbolsusa.org/Georgia/Flag_
Georgia.html (last visited Oct. 7, 2012) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
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King”); “America the Beautiful” (“God shed his grace on thee”);
418
bless America.”
Concerning the phrase “Under God” in the Pledge of Allegiance,

417

and “God

[c]ertain ceremonial references to God and religion in our Nation are the
inevitable consequence of the religious history that gave birth to our
founding principles of liberty. It would be ironic indeed if this Court
were to wield our constitutional commitment to religious freedom so as
419
to sever our ties to the traditions developed to honor it.
Consistent with Justice O’Connor’s concurrence in Elk Grove School District
v. Newdow, in Newdow v. Rio Linda Union School District, the Ninth Circuit
held that voluntary recitation of the Pledge of Allegiance did not violate the
Establishment Clause because the addition of the phrase “Under God” in 1954
advanced the secular purposes of (1) underscoring the political philosophy of the
Founding Fathers that God granted certain inalienable rights to the people which
the government cannot take away, and (2) adding a note of importance to the
420
Pledge as a matter of ceremonial deism. This decision departed from the Ninth
421
Circuit’s earlier ruling in Newdow v. United States Congress.
It is also reasonably well-established that public schools can teach and
perform sacred choral music as an integral part of a complete and historically
accurate music education, to broaden the students’ understanding of musical
422
culture and to increase awareness of diversity. Such use is permissible as long
as the sacred choral music does not predominate the music selection to create a
“principal or primary effect” to advance religion under Lemon; lead an objective
observer to conclude the school is endorsing religion under the endorsement test;
or involve proselytizing or coercing students to participate in a religious, rather
423
than musical, event, under the coercion test.

416. Rev. Samuel F. Smith, America (My Country, ‘Tis of Thee), SCOUTSONGS http://www.scoutsongs
.com/lyrics/america.html (last visited Oct. 7, 2012) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
417. Katharine Lee Bates & Samuel Ward, America the Beautiful, SCOUTSONGS, http://www.scoutsongs
.com/lyrics/americathebeautiful.html (last visited Oct. 7, 2012) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
418. Irving Berlin, God Bless America, SCOUTSONGS, http://www.scoutsongs.com/lyrics/godbless
america.html (last visited Oct. 7, 2012) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
419. Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 44–45 (2004) (O’Connor, J., concurring in
the judgment).
420. Newdown v. Rio Linda Union Sch. Dist., 597 F.3d 1007, 1042 (9th Cir. 2010).
421. 328 F.3d 466, 481–82 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that “Under God” in the Pledge of Allegiance
violates the Establishment Clause), vacated on standing grounds sub. nom., Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v.
Newdow, 542 U.S. 1 (2004).
422. See generally Richard Collin Mangrum, Shall We Sing? Shall We Sing Religious Music in Public
Schools?, 38 CREIGHTON L. REV. 815 (2005); Faith D. Kasparian, Note, The Constitutionality of Teaching and
Performing Sacred Choral Music in Public Schools, 46 DUKE L.J. 1111 (1997).
423. Mangrum, supra note 422; Kasparian, supra note 422.
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Although schools may include sacred choral music as part of an overall
music curriculum, a school is not required to do so. Thus, in Stratechuk v. Board
of Education, the Third Circuit held that a school district’s policy to bar
performance of religious holiday music at seasonal shows, while allowing it to be
taught in class, had a legitimate secular purpose of avoiding potential
424
Establishment Clause problems. This is particularly true when a school has a
history of parental complaints about which religious holiday music had been
425
included in the past.
B. Free Exercise Clause Analysis
The main issue of contention under the Free Exercise Clause concerns what
standard of review the Court should use. An important change in the level of
426
protection given to the free exercise of religion occurred in 1963. Writing for
the Court in Sherbert v. Verner, Justice Brennan said that strict scrutiny should
427
apply when a law imposes a substantial burden on the free exercise of religion.
A state had refused unemployment compensation to appellant, a member of the
Seventh-Day Adventist Church, on the ground that she had failed to accept
available suitable work when offered because she refused to work on Saturday,
428
the Sabbath day of her faith. Justice Brennan said that the effect of the law was
429
to pressure the appellant to forgo the practice of her religion. This was
compounded by the religious discrimination in the scheme, for even in times of
emergency no employee could be required to work on Sunday if he or she had
430
conscientious objections to such work. Where a substantial burden was
imposed, no showing of a mere rational relationship to some colorable state
431
interest would suffice; the state had to show a paramount interest. The state did
not show any interest in Sherbert beyond the possibility of fraudulent claims by
432
persons claiming religious objections to Saturday work.
In reaching this conclusion, Justice Brennan distinguished the 1961 case of
Braunfeld v. Brown, where the Court had refused to require an exception to a
Sunday closing law for a Jewish merchant, who would have to close on both
433
Saturday and Sunday. Justice Brennan distinguished Braunfeld because in that

424.
425.
426.
427.
428.
429.
430.
431.
432.
433.
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587 F.3d 597, 604–10 (3d Cir. 2009).
See id. at 603.
See 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
Id. at 403–06.
Id. at 399–402.
Id. at 404.
Id. at 406.
Id. at 403.
Id. at 402–09.
366 U.S. 599, 607–10 (1961).
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case, there was a strong state interest in one uniform day of rest for all workers.
Justice Brennan added that the Court was not fostering an “establishment” when
ordering compensation to be paid, because extending unemployment benefits to
Sabbatarians in common with Sunday worshipers reflects government neutrality
435
and does not interrelate religions with secular institutions. No other person’s
436
religious liberties are abridged, nor did appellant’s religious convictions make
437
her a nonproductive member of society. The Court reached a similar conclusion
in 1981 in Thomas v. Review Board of the Indiana Employment Security
Division, holding that the state could not deny a claimant who terminated his job
438
because his religious beliefs forbade participation in production of armaments.
The Court also applied a strict scrutiny approach for a burden on religious
439
beliefs in 1972 in Wisconsin v. Yoder. In Yoder, the Court held that it would
violate the free exercise rights of Amish parents to require their children to attend
440
public high school. For the Court, Chief Justice Burger said that the state did
not have an interest of sufficient magnitude to overbalance the Amish claims to
free exercise of religion, considering testimony that compulsory formal education
after the eighth grade would gravely endanger, if not destroy, the free exercise of
441
Amish religious beliefs. There was also evidence that additional years of
formal high school for Amish children would do little to serve the state’s
interests in education, especially since most Amish children plan to live in Amish
society and, with respect to those who might leave, there is nothing to suggest
that Amish qualities of reliability, self-reliance, and dedication to work would
442
fail to find ready markets in today’s society.
Despite application of strict scrutiny, courts uphold a number of cases of
government actions burdening religious beliefs as satisfying a compelling
government interest, the least restrictive alternative analysis. For example, in
United States v. Lee, the Court held that Congress could require all employers,
including Amish employers, to pay social security taxes, even if such payments

434. 374 U.S. at 403–04.
435. Id. at 409.
436. Id.
437. Id. at 409–10. Justice Stewart, concurring in Sherbert v. Verner, said that Braunfeld was wrongly
decided and should be overruled. Id. at 417–18 (Stewart, J., concurring in the result). Justice Harlan, dissenting
with Justice White, pointed out that the state law did not provide unemployment compensation for persons who
are unavailable for work for personal reasons of any kind. Id. at 422–23 (Harlan, J., joined by White, J.,
dissenting). Reflecting a Holmesian deference-to-government approach, Justice Harlan said the Court should
not require the state to carve out an exception from that principle for those unavailable because of religious
convictions. Id. Such compulsion is particularly inappropriate in light of the indirect, remote, and insubstantial
effect of the state’s decision on the exercise of appellant’s religion. See id.
438. 450 U.S. 707, 713–20 (1981).
439. 406 U.S. 205, 214 (1972).
440. Id. at 219.
441. Id. at 221.
442. Id. at 209–19.
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would violate the Amish’s religious beliefs. Congress had granted selfemployed Amish an exception from participation in the Social Security program,
but the choice not to extend that exception to Amish employers was for Congress
444
to make. Similarly, the Supreme Court, and lower federal courts, upheld other
aspects of economic regulations against free exercise challenges, such as
application of the Fair Labor Standards Act requirements on minimum wages and
record keeping requirements to religious organizations conducting “ordinary
445
commercial activities,” or application of other aspects of the tax code.
The Court also noted that a strict scrutiny standard was inappropriate if the
challenge was to how the government was conducting its own affairs, rather than
regulating the affairs of private citizens. For example, in Bowen v. Roy, the
challenger complained that the federal government’s requirement that his
daughter have a Social Security number in order for him to collect AFDC welfare
benefits violated his religious belief that assigning her a number would tend to
446
“rob the spirit” of his daughter. The Court responded, “Absent proof of an
intent to discriminate against particular religious beliefs or against religion in
general, the Government meets is burden when it demonstrates that a challenged
requirement for government benefits, neutral and uniform in its application, is a
447
reasonable means of promoting a legitimate public interest.” Similarly, the
Court held in Goldman v. Weinberger that the United States military could apply
its uniform dress regulations to deny an Orthodox Jewish service member the
448
right to wear a yarmulke while on duty. In Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery
Protective Ass’n, the Court applied the doctrine of Bowen v. Roy to conclude,
under a rational basis approach, that the government could permit the harvesting
of timber and construction of a road on federal government land, despite
objections from three Native American tribes that such activities interfered with a
449
portion of that land they traditionally used for religious purposes.
In 1990, however, a majority of the Supreme Court in Employment Division
450
v. Smith changed the Free Exercise doctrine. In Smith, persons were dismissed
from their jobs because of their religious use of peyote, illegal under state law,

443. 455 U.S. 252, 256–61 (1982).
444. Id. at 261.
445. See, e.g., Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Bd. of Equalization, 493 U.S. 378, 392–97 (1990); Tony &
Susan Alamo Found. v. Sec’y of Labor, 471 U.S. 290, 303–06 (1985) (addressing the FLSA in the context of
minimum wage case); Lull v. Comm’r of IRS, 602 F.2d 1166, 1172 (4th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1014
(1980); Autenrieth v. Cullen, 418 F.2d 586, 587–89 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1036 (1970)
(applying the FLSA in the context of taxation cases).
446. 476 U.S. 693, 696–701 (1986).
447. Id. at 707–08.
448. 475 U.S. 503, 505–10 (1986).
449. Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439, 441–42, 447–51 (1988).
450. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
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and the resulting denial of unemployment compensation. Justice Scalia, joined
by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Stevens, White, and Kennedy, wrote that
the use of strict scrutiny in Free Exercise cases did not extend beyond: (1)
unemployment compensation cases involving denial for refusing to work for
religious reasons, such as working on one’s sabbath, as in Sherbert v. Verner,
based on that precedent being “settled law”; (2) cases involving “hybrid” claims,
that is, claims based on a conjunction of Free Exercise claims combined with
other constitutional protections, such as Freedom of Speech, or, as in Wisconsin
v. Yoder, the right of parents to direct the education of their children, where the
related right would trigger strict scrutiny on its own; or (3) cases involving direct
452
discrimination against religion.
An example of the third kind of case is Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye,
453
Inc. v. City of Hialeah. In this case, the city adopted a special rule regarding the
ritual slaughtering of animals, which was different and more burdensome than
454
the rules regarding slaughtering of animals for secular food purposes. The
Court thus applied a strict scrutiny approach and held the ordinance
455
unconstitutional.
In the absence of these three circumstances, the Court held in Smith that
where there is a general neutral regulation that has merely an incidental effect on
456
the exercise of religion, the Court will not use a heightened level of review. To
do so, said Justice Scalia, would be to allow a person, by virtue of his beliefs, to
457
become a law unto himself. He said this would contradict constitutional
458
traditions and common sense. Justice Scalia distinguished the use of strict
scrutiny in cases of race discrimination or content regulation of speech, where the
heightened level produced equality of treatment or an unrestricted flow of
speech, with what would be produced here: a private right to ignore a generally
applicable law that denies unemployment compensation when dismissal results

451. Id. at 874–78. For a good discussion of the background facts surrounding the Smith case, see
GARRETT EPPS, TO AN UNKNOWN GOD: RELIGIOUS FREEDOM ON TRIAL (2001).
452. Smith, 494 U.S. at 876–85.
453. 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
454. Id. at 527–28.
455. Id. at 530–47; see also Fraternal Order of Police Newark Lodge No. 12 v. City of Newark, 170
F.3d 359, 364–66 (3d Cir. 1999) (finding a police department’s decision to provide medical exemptions to its
no-beard requirement, while refusing religious exemptions from same requirement, was subject to heightened
scrutiny based on religious discrimination), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 817 (1999). But see Valov v. Dep’t of Motor
Vehicles, 34 Cal. Rptr. 3d 174, 178–83 (Ct. App. 2005) (holding a California statute requiring full-face
photograph on driver’s licenses, with no exemption for persons whose religious beliefs bar such personal
photographs, constitutional as a neutral law promoting expeditious identification of persons during traffic stops
and at accident scenes, deterring identity theft, and preventing fraud, relying on Smith and Bowen v. Roy).
456. 494 U.S. at 881.
457. Id. at 877–78.
458. Id. at 874–76.
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from using an illegal drug. Subsequently, the state of Oregon created a
religious exemption for peyote use, but that is a matter of legislative choice, not
460
constitutional mandate.
Reacting to the Smith case, Congress passed the Religious Freedom
461
Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA). RFRA called for courts to use strict scrutiny
whenever any government substantially burdens a person’s exercise of religion,
462
even if the burden results from a law of general applicability. In City of Boerne
463
v. Flores, the Court declared RFRA invalid as applied to state laws. Congress
sought to justify RFRA as an exercise of power under Section five of the
464
Fourteenth Amendment. Justice Kennedy said that there must be congruence
and proportionality between the injury to be prevented or modified and the means
465
adopted to that end. Here, the legislative record lacked examples of modern
466
instances of generally applicable laws passed because of religious bigotry. The
RFRA, said Justice Kennedy, is so out of proportion to a supposed remedial or
preventing object that it cannot be understood as responsive to, or designed to
467
prevent, unconstitutional behavior on the part of States. Justice O’Connor said
that Smith was wrong and should be re-examined, as did Justices Breyer and
468
Souter.
Congress did not surrender, but has only been able to change the law
somewhat. Under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of
2000 (RLUIPA), a strict scrutiny approach is statutorily applied to all laws
regarding any land use regulation or prison regulation that imposes a substantial
burden on religion if: (1) that burden affects, or removal of that burden would
itself affect, interstate commerce; (2) the burden is imposed in a program or
activity receiving federal financial aid; or (3) the burden is imposed in
implementation of any regulation that permits individual assessments of the

459. Id. at 885–90.
460. Current Oregon law regarding peyote use appears at Oregon Revised Statutes section 475.840.
Justice O’Connor, concurring in the judgment, and Justice Blackmun, joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall,
dissenting, said the essence of a free exercise claim is relief from a burden imposed by government on religious
practices or beliefs, whether imposed directly through prohibitions or indirectly by the denial of a benefit. Id. at
893–97, 905–07 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment, joined in Parts I & II by Brennan, Marshall &
Blackmun, JJ.). In either case, the government should have to satisfy a strict standard, as called for in Sherbert
and Yoder. Id. (finding strict scrutiny met on these facts); id. at 907–16 (Blackmun, J., joined by Brennan &
Marshall, JJ., dissenting) (finding statute unconstitutional under strict scrutiny).
461. Pub. L. 103–141 (Nov. 16, 1993), codified in 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb–2000bb-4 (2006).
462. Id.
463. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
464. Id. at 529–36.
465. Id. at 529–30.
466. Id. at 533.
467. Id. at 530–36.
468. Id. at 544–45 (O’Connor, J., joined by Breyer, J., except as to the first paragraph of Part I,
dissenting); id. at 565 (Souter, J., dissenting).

160

05_KELSO_VER_01_6-11-12_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

7/22/2013 2:33 PM

McGeorge Law Review / Vol. 44
469

proposed property use. The validity of this legislation in the context of a prison
regulation was upheld in Cutter v. Wilkinson, where the Court unanimously ruled
that the statute was merely an attempt to respect the Free Exercise rights of
prisoners and did not create an Establishment Clause problem as long as the
statute did not “elevate accommodation of religious observances over the
470
institution’s need to maintain order and safety.”
In Hankins v. Lyght, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the earlierpassed RFRA on Commerce Clause grounds, as applied to federal rather than
471
state laws. In Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, the
Supreme Court similarly applied the RFRA’s compelling interest test to strike
down the failure under the federal Controlled Substance Act to grant an
472
exception for sacramental use of hallucinogenic tea. The decision was
unanimous, with Justice Alito not participating in the consideration or decision of
473
the case. Meanwhile, in cases not covered by RLUIPA or the RFRA, lower
courts continue to apply Smith and its holding that the court should only apply a
rational relation test even when a substantial burden has been imposed on the
474
exercise of religious behavior.
One might wonder why religious conservatives undermined strict scrutiny
Free Exercise Clause review in Smith. The key is found in a passage near the end
475
of Justice Scalia’s opinion in Smith. There, he stated,
It may fairly be said that leaving accommodation to the political process
will place at a relative disadvantage those religious practices that are not
widely engaged in; but that unavoidable consequence of democratic
government must be preferred to a system in which each conscience is a
476
law unto itself . . . .
Thus, the presumption seems to be that religions more well-established in the
United States in terms of overall numbers of adherents, like Protestant sects or
Catholics, will be protected by the legislature as part of democratic sensitivity to
the majority, while only religions of small groups would need Free Exercise
Clause protection. Typically, it has been such minority religious groups—Amish,
Seventh-Day Adventists, Native Americans, or Jews—that have triggered

469. Pub. L. 106–274 (Sept. 22, 2000), codified in 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc–2000cc-5 (2006).
470. 544 U.S. 709, 719–26 (2005).
471. 441 F.3d 96, 107–09 (2d Cir. 2006).
472. 546 U.S. 418, 424–39 (2006).
473. Id. at 439.
474. See, e.g., Levitan v. Ashcroft, 281 F.3d 1313, 1315 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (holding where prisoners did
not raise RLUIPA, the court analyzed under the Free Exercise Clause a prison rule allowing only the chaplain to
consume wine during Communion services under a rational basis standard of review).
475. Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990).
476. Id.
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litigation. And, as a general matter, it is liberal Justices who are usually more
sensitive to protecting minority rights, which occurs under the 1963–1990
478
Sherbert v. Verner strict scrutiny approach.
That this doctrine can yield anomalous results is evidenced by the dispute
this past year over the Obama Administration’s requirement that all employers,
either themselves or through their health insurers, provide contraceptive coverage
under their health care plans, even Catholic-affiliated institutions, like
universities or hospitals, which have traditional religious objections to
479
contraception. Under Sherbert, the Catholic Church could force the government
480
to satisfy strict scrutiny to impose this obligation on them. Under the Smith
doctrine, the Catholic Church does not appear to have any serious Free Exercise
argument, although, consistent with the Second Circuit Court of Appeals opinion
481
in Hankins, noted above, they may have a statutory RFRA argument.
In addition to these protections, all Justices on the Supreme Court support a
“ministerial” exception to laws applied to the internal operations of religious
organizations. For example, a unanimous Supreme Court upheld a ministerial
exception in Hossana-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. Equal
482
Employment Opportunity Commission. That case involved a teacher, formally
commissioned as a minister in the religious order, who filed an Equal
483
Employment Opportunity complaint.
This decision is consistent with lower federal courts handling of similar
issues. For example, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held in Tomic v.
Catholic Diocese of Peoria, that the ministerial exception bars an ADEA lawsuit
by a fifty-year-old church music director who was fired after a dispute with the
484
bishop’s assistant over music to be played for Easter services. The church then
485
hired a “much younger person” as a replacement. The court noted that,
if the suit were permitted to go forward, the diocese would argue that he
was dismissed for a religious reason—his opinion concerning the
suitability of particular music for Easter services—and . . . Tomic would
argue that the church’s criticism of his musical choices was a pretext for

477. See supra text accompanying notes 446–62.
478. Id.
479. See generally N.C. Aizenman, Peter Wallsten & Karen Tumulty, Obama Shifts on Birth Control,
WASH. POST, Feb. 11, 2012, at A01.
480. See supra text accompanying notes 427–37.
481. See supra text accompanying notes 472–76.
482. 132 S. Ct. 694 (2012).
483. Id. at 699–701.
484. 442 F.3d 1036, 1037–42 (7th Cir. 2006).
485. Id. at 1037.
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firing him, that the real reason was his age. . . . The court would be asked
486
to resolve a theological dispute.
Similarly, in Curay-Cramer v. Ursuline Academy of Wilmington, Delaware, Inc.,
the Third Circuit Court of Appeals held that a teacher at a private Catholic school
could not sue the school for retaliation for protected speech and sex
discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, when she
487
was terminated after signing a pro-choice advertisement in a local newspaper.
The court held that her claims were not cognizable, since it would necessitate the
488
court’s assessment of the relative severity of violations of church doctrine. The
Court noted:
Were we . . . to require Ursuline [Academy] to treat Jewish males or
males who oppose the war in Iraq the same as a Catholic female who
publicly advocates pro-choice positions, we would be meddling in
matters related to a religious organization’s ability to define the
489
parameters of what constitutes orthodoxy.
On the other hand, the Ninth Circuit held in Elvig v. Calvin Presbyterian
Church that a Presbyterian minister could sue her former church under Title VII
for sexual harassment and retaliation that occurred prior to her discharge that do
490
not implicate the church’s protected employment decisions. In her complaint,
she alleged that shortly after the Calvin Presbyterian Church hired her as the
Associate Pastor, the Church’s Pastor engaged in sexually harassing and
491
intimidating conduct toward her, creating a hostile work environment. The
Court noted that as part of this lawsuit, the Church could:
assert as an affirmative defense that they “exercised reasonable care to
prevent and correct the harassment, and that [the plaintiff] failed to take
advantage of these opportunities to avoid or limit harm.” . . . “Nothing in
the character of this defense will require a jury to evaluate religious
492
doctrine or the ‘reasonableness’ of . . . religious practices . . . .”

486.
487.
488.
489.
490.
491.
492.
1999).

Id. at 1040.
450 F.3d 130, 138–42 (3d Cir. 2006).
Id. at 142.
Id. at 141.
375 F.3d 951, 953 (9th Cir. 2004), rehearing en banc denied, 397 F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 2005).
Id.
Id. at 957 (quoting Bollard v. Cal. Province of the Soc’y of Jesus, 196 F.3d 940, 949–50 (9th Cir.
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The court noted that while the decision to terminate her ministry was clearly
within the scope of the ministerial exception, she may “nonetheless hold the
493
Church vicariously liable for the sexual harassment itself.”
A federal district court held in Redhead v. Conference of Seventh-Day
Adventists that the “ministerial exception” did not apply to Title VII sex and
pregnancy discrimination claims by a teacher who was terminated from a
Seventh-Day Adventist school for being pregnant and unmarried, as her teaching
494
duties were primarily secular. Her duties that were religious in nature were
limited to only one hour of Bible instruction per day and attending religious
495
ceremonies with students only once per year. Churches have also been held
liable in child sex abuse cases by church personnel, including priests or ministers,
although it is a matter of debate whether various laws limiting damages against
496
charitable institutions should be invoked to limit liability in such cases.
V. CONCLUSION
As noted in this Article, for most of his twenty-five years on the United
States Supreme Court, Justice Kennedy has been predominantly known as a
moderate civil libertarian. Justice Kennedy’s moderate civil-libertarian approach
can be seen most prominently in four different areas of Supreme Court
jurisprudence: (1) due process and equal protection clause analysis, (2) First
Amendment freedom of speech, (3) criminal defendants’ constitutional rights,
and (4) structural issues of separation of powers and federalism. In certain cases,
however, he has joined his more conservative judicial colleagues, and may join
them in future cases. These areas include existing doctrine, such as cases
involving (1) state sovereign immunity, (2) the Bush v. Gore election case, (3)
cases involving the Second Amendment and right to bear arms, (4) campaign
finance litigation, (5) the constitutionality of the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act (Obamacare), and (6) affirmative action cases. With respect
to the religion clauses of the First Amendment—the Establishment Clause and
the Free Exercise Clause—Justice Kennedy has likewise adopted more
conservative judicial positions.
It is possible that Justice Kennedy may lean more toward the conservative
side in later high-profile cases. If so, his legacy on the Court may not be as a
moderate civil libertarian, which is his legacy today, but reflect more the
conservative strain in his jurisprudence. For those who have applauded Justice
Kennedy’s moderate civil-libertarian decisions, that would be an unfortunate

493. Id. at 960.
494. 440 F. Supp. 2d 211, 220–24 (E.D.N.Y. 2006).
495. Id.
496. On this issue, see generally Catharine Pierce Wells, Churches, Charities, and Corrective Justices:
Making Churches Pay for the Sins of Their Clergy, 44 B.C. L. REV. 1201 (2003).
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development. Further, since a moderate civil-libertarian approach reflects more
aspects of a progressive agenda, and since over time, progressive ideology tends
to prevail over conservative ideology because it represents the future, not the
past, history would not likely view kindly any such shift toward a more
conservative jurisprudential stance.
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